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SHAME, REGRET, AND CONTRACT
DESIGN
ERIC A. ZACKS
This Article examines whether contract design can influence the postformation behavior of the non-drafting party. If it can, contract preparers
may be able to obtain significant transactional advantages. This Article
suggests that several contractual features can be explained in terms of
their ability to exploit the cognitive biases of, and to induce particular
“advantageous” emotions from, the non-drafting party after the contract
has been executed. These features may include arbitration provisions,
disclosures in capital letter or bold face type, “reliance” language, and
language framing possible losses in particular ways. Contracts can
encourage individuals to feel shame, to blame themselves, to believe that
contracts are sacred promises that should be specifically performed, to
utilize faulty judgment heuristics when determining contract costs, and to
rely on misperceived social norms with respect to challenging or
breaching contracts. This may influence them not to breach or challenge
an otherwise uneconomical, unconscionable, or illegal contract.
Consequently, contract preparers may be able to enjoy the benefits of
promises that often would not be realized if the non-drafting party were
profit-maximizing like the contract preparer.
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“We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and
endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us.
This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the
eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct.”
1
—Adam Smith
“[Y]et, now that I recall all the circumstances, I think I can see a little into
the springs and motives which being cunningly presented to me under
various disguises, induced me to set about performing the part I did,
besides cajoling me into the delusion that it was a choice resulting from
my own unbiased freewill and discriminating judgment.”
2
—Herman Melville
I. INTRODUCTION
Contracts can be “experienced” in a number of settings. Nondrafting parties will encounter them at some point in time prior to
execution, adjudicators may examine them in the event of a contractual
dispute, and the non-drafting parties may return to the contract in the
event of a problem or dispute. If these experiences can be anticipated,
one would expect competitive drafting parties to prepare contracts that
attempt to influence the behavior of each of these different parties. As
profit-maximizers (and often repeat-players), contract preparers are
compelled to engage in this type of behavior or risk losing to
3
competitors in the marketplace. Such contracts may be effective in
influencing behavior to the extent based on an understanding of human
behavioral and psychological processes, including an understanding of
4
human emotions and cognitive biases. Accordingly, the contracting
behavior of non-drafting parties before and after the time of execution

1. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 112 (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Macfie eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1759).
2. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK: OR, THE WHALE 23–24 (Signet Classics 2013)
(1851).
3. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 726 (1999) (arguing that
“[c]ognitive biases present profit-maximizing opportunities that manufacturers [and
presumably all contract preparers] must take advantage of in order to stay apace with
competition. Whether by design or not, the market will evolve to a state in which only firms
that capitalize on consumer cognitive anomalies survive”).
4. See id. at 635.
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as well as the behavior of adjudicative parties may be anticipated and
exploited within the written contract with the goal of ensuring a
particular contractual result.
This Article explores the unique and important issue of whether
contract design can influence the post-formation behavior of the nondrafting party. If it can, contract preparers may be significantly
advantaged. This Article suggests that several contractual features can
be explained in terms of their ability to exploit the cognitive biases of,
and to induce particular “advantageous” emotions from, the other party
after the contract has been executed. These features may include
arbitration provisions, disclosures in capital letter or bold-face type,
“reliance” language, and language framing possible losses in particular
5
ways. Contracts can encourage individuals to feel shame, to blame
themselves, to believe that contracts are sacred promises that should be
specifically performed, to utilize faulty judgment heuristics when
determining contract costs, and to rely on misperceived social norms
6
with respect to challenging or breaching contracts. This may influence
them not to breach or challenge an otherwise uneconomical,
7
unconscionable, or illegal contract. Consequently, contract preparers
may be able to enjoy the benefits of promises that often would not be
realized if the other contracting party were profit-maximizing like the
8
contract preparer.
Contract design may influence the decision-making behavior of the
party that did not prepare the contract at the time of contract
negotiation and execution and also influence adjudicators in the event of
9
a dispute. This Article extends the analysis of contract design to the

5. See infra Parts II.D, III.B, III.E, IV.
6. See infra Parts II–III.
7. See Samuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts:
Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 199,
216 (2010) (noting that consumers may “tend to perceive” contracts with unconscionable
terms as binding).
8. See, e.g., Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the
Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 971–72 (2010).
9. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage
Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1079 (2009) (explaining the design of subprime
mortgage contracts “can be explained as a rational market response to the imperfect
rationality of borrowers,” specifically that “[i]f myopic and optimistic borrowers focus on the
short term and discount the long term, then lenders will offer deferred-cost contracts with low
short-term prices and high long-term prices”); Eric A. Zacks, Contracting Blame, 15 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 169, 171 (2012) (suggesting that contract preparers can anticipate and exploit the
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context of the ex post behavior of the contracting parties themselves.
Contractual features that may seem irrelevant to the business deal or to
ex ante contracting behavior may be very influential upon ex post
10
contracting behavior.
For example, this Article argues that contracts may be purposely
prepared to evoke particular emotions from the contract parties after
the time of contract execution. Thus, one should identify and scrutinize
contractual features that portray the promises contained within the
contract as having a moral component. The idea of breaching a “moral”
promise might be able to instill anticipatory shame, guilt, or fear in the
11
non-drafting party. For example, a contract may contain provisions
intended to induce a party ex post to believe that the breach of, or
challenge to, the contracts as written would be immoral, even though
economically the party may be better off if she breached or challenged
the contract and the party may have substantial legal grounds to
challenge the promises made within the written contract. By preparing
the contract to reinforce the belief that contractual promises have a
moral component (whether through particular contract language or
features or the inclusion of particular provisions that reinforce the social
norm of contract compliance, such as an arbitration provision), the
contract preparer can prepare more advantageous contracts (even those
that contain illegal or unenforceable terms) with the knowledge that the
contracts rarely will be challenged. Shame and other negative emotions
are powerful, often unconscious or uncontrollable, and can inhibit a
12
contracting party from acting in her best interest. Similarly, and even
more problematically, given the depiction of the moral nature of the
promise, the contract preparer can expect an adjudicator to be
13
particularly harsh in judging a breach of such promises.
As another example, contract preparers may utilize arbitration
provisions within all of their contracts, which are usually ignored or not
14
negotiated by the other contract party. The contract preparer may
cognitive biases of adjudicators (as opposed to the contracting parties themselves) to induce
them to blame or otherwise feel a particular way about the other contract party).
10. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 7, at 206.
11. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathon Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics
in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 406 (2009) (suggesting that “people
are quite sensitive to the moral dimensions of a breach of contract”).
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 420–21; Zacks, supra note 9, at 182.
14. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
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include such a provision not because of cost efficiency or the possibility
of more favorable judgments (as compared with standard litigation),
although such factors may be important as well.
Instead, the
confidential nature of the arbitration proceedings for all similarly
situated contracting parties (in each instance, the party that did not
prepare the contract) may be the most attractive feature of an
15
arbitration provision. Confidentiality regarding disputes reinforces the
social norm of not challenging an unfavorable contract, whether the
challenge is in the form of a decision to breach or to contest the
16
enforcement of a contract. If contract parties do not perceive others as
challenging particular contracts or particular contractual provisions,
then they may be less likely to do so themselves. By relying on social
proof, or looking to the practices of others, contracting parties may be
acting with incomplete information when the actual practices of others
cannot be detected (because of the confidential nature of any
17
proceedings in which one would challenge a particular contract).
Thus, the framework and formatting of the written contract may not
be explicitly negotiated, but these and other features will have effects
beyond the express promises contained in the contract. By utilizing
language and formats designed to induce passivity after the contract has
been executed, contract preparers may be able to enforce or enjoy the
benefits of promises that often would not be enjoyed if the other
contracting party was a profit-maximizer and repeat-player like the
contract preparer.
The consequences of this critique are significant. The result is a
further distortion and undercutting of the model of contracting parties
PROBS. 55, 73 (2004) (“[T]his study provides little basis for believing that consumers are
making informed decisions when they ‘agree’ to arbitrate . . . .”); id. at 56 (“Perhaps most
central to the debate are concerns that consumers do not fully understand the terms of these
agreements, and that, even if they did, they cannot negotiate those terms, which are offered
on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis.” (footnote omitted)); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F.
Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 173 (2006) (suggesting that
“there is every reason to believe” that credit card holders will not act upon disclosure of an
arbitration clause).
15. See Eric A. Zacks, Unstacking the Deck? Contract Manipulation and Credit Card
Accountability, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1497 (2010) (stating that “arbitration proceedings
typically are confidential and leave a limited (if any) written record. The result of this lack of
publicity and public record can restrict societal awareness of any wrongdoing . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
16. See id.; see also Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1672 (2005).
17. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1672.
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as rational actors acting with perfect information. It can hardly be said
that many contracting parties are aware that they can be induced to act
in a particular way based on contract presentation. Instead, contracting
parties are just assessing the bargain (if they do anything at all) at the
time of contract execution. The results, of course, may not be
problematic if everyone viewed (or did not view) the promises made in
18
contracts as being sacred. The issue is, as stated above, individuals may
do so while the repeat players (the contract preparers) generally do not,
resulting in a disequilibrium where particular social norms are
reinforced to the economic detriment of a subordinate group. It is
through the perpetuation of the norms of sacred or moral promise, and
by evoking anticipatory negative emotions in the contracting party when
deciding whether to breach or challenge a contract, that repeat players
maintain the ability to enjoy the benefits of one-sided or unenforceable
contracts.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II introduces shame as an
example of a primary negative emotion and examines its relevance to
the perpetuation of social norms that reinforce contracts as sacred moral
promises. Shame will also be examined in light of its effect, generated in
part by particular features or formatting of written contracts, upon the
post-contract formation behavior and decision-making processes of
contracting parties. Next, Part III examines how, in a similar fashion,
particular cognitive biases and judgment heuristics of contracting parties
in the post-contract formation context may be anticipated and exploited
by the contract preparer. This Article then addresses the implications of
these practices in Part IV. Part V concludes that the lack of
transparency regarding contract design practices and the effects of such
practices on post-contract formation behavior severely undermine the
normative goals of contract law. Without the awareness and critical
examination of such practices, contract law may permit the creation and
reinforcement of artificial cultural and social norms that do not reflect
or address the goals of all contracting parties.
II. SHAME AND CONTRACT DESIGN
Contract preparers may be able to design contracts to induce the
other contract party to experience (or anticipate the experience of)
18. See Andrew Galbraith & Jason Dean, China Often Snubs Business Norms, WALL ST.
J., Sep. 6, 2011, at B2 (describing how contractual promises have less moral significance in
particular countries).
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negative emotions such as shame. Analyzing the emotions, internal
beliefs, physiology, and behaviors associated with shame may enable a
better understanding of the importance of shame in human decision19
making and actions. Shame is a distressing and difficult emotion, and
the behaviors associated with shame or avoiding shame can help explain
20
human behavior and, in particular, human contracting behavior. This
Part describes shame from biological, behavioral, and social perspectives
and suggests possible uses of anticipatory feelings of shame in contract
preparation.
A. The Shame Experience in Contract
Described as “perhaps the most negative and disturbing emotional
experience,” the experience of shame “follows events in which the
individual violates rules of a moral nature that apply to core aspects of
21
the self.”
Shame is often understood as a negative emotional
experience as well as a set of internal beliefs about one’s self or
22
behaviors demonstrating shame. It is experienced as a self-conscious
emotional response, associated with physiological and behavioral
responses, to a situation in which one determines that her behavior or
23
self would be judged unfavorably. This self-assessment is based on
19. Tara L. Gruenewald et al., A Social Function for Self-Conscious Emotions: The
Social Self Preservation Theory, in THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND
RESEARCH 68, 82 (Jessica L. Tracy et al. eds., 2007) (describing the “premise that has existed
since the time of Darwin that shame serves an important function essential to social life”).
20. As has been noted elsewhere, emotions have an “apparent immunity to conscious
control,” meaning that “[m]ost people cannot simply change their emotional state by an act of
will based on deciding what they want to be feeling right now.” ROY F. BAUMEISTER, THE
CULTURAL ANIMAL: HUMAN NATURE, MEANING, AND SOCIAL LIFE 252 (2005).
Accordingly, individuals cope with their emotions with different strategies. Id. at 253.
21. Dacher Keltner & Lee Anne Harker, The Forms and Functions of the Nonverbal
Signal of Shame, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND
CULTURE 78, 78 (Paul Gilbert & Bernice Andrews eds., 1998).
22. Paul Gilbert, What is Shame? Some Core Issues and Controversies, in SHAME:
INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 3, 3–4;
Jessica L. Tracy & Richard W. Robins, The Self in Self-Conscious Emotions: A Cognitive
Appraisal Approach, in THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra
note 19, at 3, 4–5 (contrasting basic emotions such as happiness or sadness with “selfconscious emotions” and “cognition-dependent emotions” such as shame).
23. Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 69 (“[S]hame appears to be a common
emotional response to threat to the social self, the activation of specific physiological systems
often accompanies shame responses to social-self threat, and these psychobiological responses
are associated with specific behavioral reactions . . . .”). In general, “social harmony and
order are maintained, not by the subject’s feelings for others, but by the subject’s feelings
concerning how they are regarded by others: the opposite pull of pride and shame keep the
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24

how others might or do perceive the individual. Accordingly, given the
importance of the social self to life success, “shame may be one of the
25
most basic of human emotions.”
Further, it appears that it is not
simply related to failure to meet a particular standard, but instead
26
connected to being perceived as “unattractive” in some way. Shame
may then influence individuals’ “biobehavioral responses” to the threat
or experience of believing that others do or will perceive them as being
27
unattractive.
From a contracting standpoint, one can understand shame as being
actually experienced or anticipated in multiple settings. If one breaches
a contract and is sued or is sent a notice of the breach, one may feel
shame associated with the public nature of a lawsuit alleging that one
does not abide by her promises. Similarly, one may feel anticipatory
shame if one suffers a loss under the contract: an individual may feel
shame for suffering a loss that she perceives no one else as suffering and
a loss that, if known by others, would result in others judging her
28
harshly. Thus, it could be the anticipation of these shame feelings that
rope of social restraint tight.” J.M. BARBALET, EMOTION, SOCIAL THEORY, AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE: A MACROSOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 108 (2001); Gilbert, supra note 22, at 6
(“Shame is . . . often defined as acute arousal or fear of being exposed, scrutinized, and
judged negatively by others.”); Tracy & Robins, supra note 22, at 6 (describing how “[s]elfconscious emotions [such as shame] facilitate the attainment of complex social goals”
(emphasis omitted)); Thomas J. Scheff, Shame and Conformity: The Deference-Emotion
System, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 395, 398 (1988) (“[S]hame is caused by the perception of negative
evaluations of the self.” (emphasis omitted)).
24. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 17 (“Generally, shame seems to focus on either the social
world (beliefs about how others see the self), the internal world (how one sees oneself), or
both (how one sees oneself as a consequence of how one thinks others see the self).”);
Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 68–69 (noting that shame may be experienced “when the
fundamental goal of maintaining a positive social self is threatened,” which is experienced
based on “an actual or likely loss of social esteem, status, or acceptance”).
25. Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 68. Accordingly, “[m]oral emotions [such as
shame] provide the motivational force—the power and the energy—to do good and to avoid
doing bad.” June Price Tangney et al., What’s Moral about the Self-Conscious Emotions?, in
THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 21, 25 (citing
Jerome Kroll & Elizabeth Egan, Psychiatry, Moral Worry, and the Moral Emotions, 10 J.
PSYCHIATRIC PRAC. 352 (2004)).
26. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 19; see also Michael Lewis, Shame and Stigma, in SHAME:
INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 126,
126 (“Shame is elicited when one experiences failure relative to a standard (one’s own or
other people’s), feels responsible for the failure, and believes that the failure reflects a
damaged self.”).
27. Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 69.
28. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 6–7 (“In shame, the self is both the agent and object of
observation and disapproval, as shortcomings of the defective self are exposed before an
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serves as an impetus to avoiding breach or challenging the contract.
Shame feelings may function to “warn” an individual that she will be
“punished” through shame by acting in a particular manner, and she is
30
influenced accordingly. Rather than actually experiencing shame upon
a breach or notice of a breach, the individual may decide not to breach
31
because she anticipates such negative feelings.
In yet another setting, one may feel anticipatory shame if one is
contemplating challenging or willfully breaching a contract. If one
perceives that the group norm is to comply with contractual promises
without question or challenge, then one may feel anticipatory feelings of
internalized observing ‘other.’” (quoting June Price Tangney & Rowland S. Miller, Are
Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment Distinct Emotions?, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1256, 1257 (1996))).
29. Deborah F. Greenwald & David W. Harder, Domains of Shame: Evolutionary,
Cultural, and Psychotherapeutic Aspects, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR,
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 225, 225 (discussing shame as “a
signal that orients one to potential, but usually avoidable, negative social consequences”);
James Macdonald, Disclosing Shame, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR,
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 141, 148 (describing studies
demonstrating that “avoidance was associated with the threat of shame or embarrassment”);
Marcel Zeelenberg, The Use of Crying Over Spilled Milk: A Note on the Rationality and
Functionality of Regret, 12 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 325, 326 (1999) (“[W]hen making decisions we
not only predict the utility that will be provided by these options, as assumed in rational
choice theory, we also predict the emotions that arise from comparing the result of that
option with the results of options foregone.”). Zeelenberg notes, however, that “we may
sometimes overestimate the duration of our future emotions and also overestimate the
intensity of emotional reactions to events,” which can “cause inaccurate predictions of
experience utility, and thus lead to irrational (i.e. inaccurate) choices.” Id. at 333 (citing
Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting,
75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 (1998)). Perhaps, as I have argued in this Article,
individuals are induced to overestimate their own reactions, whether by overstating the
likelihood or impact of the consequences.
30. Macdonald, supra note 29, at 146 (describing “ideoaffective structures” or “scripts”
that “are constructed by individuals around various core affects, and the function of these
theories is to guide the interpretation, experience, and reaction to events in one’s
environment” (citing 2 SILVAN S. TOMKINS, AFFECT IMAGERY CONSCIOUSNESS 422
(1963))). The shame affect script is intended to assist the individual in avoiding the negative
affect (shame). Id.
31. See Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 235 (“A premonition of shame, rather
than an intense experience of the affect, can serve as a signal to avoid those behaviors in each
domain that might give rise to a full-blown shame state.”); see also BAUMEISTER, supra note
20, at 267 (describing how negative emotions operate via anticipation, as “[w]hen you face a
decision on how to act, you realize that one action could lead to your feeling guilty, and so
you tend to avoid that course of action. Guilt [and presumably shame] can therefore exert a
great deal of influence over behavior without the person feeling guilty [or shameful] very
often, because people simply avoid doing things that will make them feel guilty [or
shameful]”).
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shame associated with actions that would, if undertaken, challenge the
group norms (and result in public degradation). The group norm, as
described below, can be enhanced or depicted in a particular way
32
through the written contract itself. Thus, “[a]ffects such as shame and
guilt play a useful, even essential, role in guiding individuals’ behavior to
33
match well with the values of their particular group.” It should be
noted that guiding behavior in this sense does not mean guiding
behavior towards the economically efficient outcome, although that is
34
not necessarily precluded.
B. Shame and Contracting Behavior
With respect to shame behavior or decisions, one who feels or
anticipates shame is likely to act in a submissive fashion to “accept” or
35
“hide from” the shame.
As “an inner experience of self as an
unattractive social agent,” an individual typically feels “pressure to limit
36
possible damage to self via escape or appeasement.” Interestingly,
32. See infra Part II.D.
33. Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 226.
34. See id.
35. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 22 (“One of the most common beliefs about shame is that
it motivates hiding and desires to ‘sink into the ground.’”); Keltner & Harker, supra note 21,
at 78 (describing how “[s]hame is characterized by . . . the pronounced desire to withdraw and
disappear”); Macdonald, supra note 29, at 142 (describing the “reasonable consensus among
theorists, researchers, and lay people that the experience of shame involves an impulse to get
away from other people, an action tendency of interpersonal avoidance”); Allan N. Schore,
Early Shame Experiences and Infant Brain Development, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL
BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 57, 71 (describing the
“classical conception of shame as a feeling of being visible and exposed to the eyes of an
Other, which leads to an urge to hide and cover one’s face” (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON,
CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 222–24 (1st ed. 1950))). Macdonald also describes other research
suggesting “that shame can have preemptive functions and, in this capacity, prompt a
considerable range of behaviors designed to conceal and protect the self.” Macdonald, supra
note 29, at 147 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE
236 (1959); TOMKINS, supra note 30); see also ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 7–10 (1963).
36. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 22; see also Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 227
(“Phenomenologically, shame has been described as a self-conscious awareness that one is
being viewed, or might be viewed, by others with an unflattering gaze.” (internal citations
omitted) (citing David W. Harder, Shame and Guilt Assessment, and Relationships of Shameand Guilt-Proneness to Psychopathology, in SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF SHAME, GUILT, EMBARRASSMENT, AND PRIDE 368 (June Price Tangney
& Kurt W. Fischer eds., 1995); RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION & ADAPTATION 240 (1991);
HELEN B. LEWIS, SHAME AND GUILT IN NEUROSIS 197–200, 202 (1971); Janice LindsayHartz et al., Differentiating Guilt and Shame and Their Effects on Motivation, in SELFCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SHAME, GUILT, EMBARRASSMENT, AND
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shame and shame responses typically are accompanied by particular
physiological symptoms or experiences often connected or associated
37
with submissive behavior. For example, shame is often associated with
a “rapid inhibition of excitement, a sudden decrement in mounting
pleasure, and cardiac deceleration” as well as activation of the
orbitofrontal cortex, which is an area of the brain associated with
38
internal inhibition.
PRIDE, supra at 274; Tamara J. Ferguson et al., Children’s Understanding of Guilt and Shame,
62 CHILD DEV. 827 (1991); June Price Tangney, Situational Determinants of Shame and Guilt
in Young Adulthood, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 199, 199 (1992); Frank W.
Wicker et al., Participant Descriptions of Guilt and Shame, 7 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 25
(1983))); Lewis, supra note 26, at 126 (“Shame is best understood as an intense negative
emotion having to do with the self in relation to standards, responsibility, and such
attributions as global self-failure.” (citing MICHAEL LEWIS, SHAME: THE EXPOSED SELF 1–6
(1992))).
37. Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 69 (describing how “the activation of specific
physiological systems often accompanies shame responses to social-self threat”).
38. Schore, supra note 35, at 69–70. It appears that “[t]he involvement of orbitofrontalvagal connections in shame is suggested by the ‘active restraining quality’ of this affect, which
brakes arousal and triggers a ‘partial paralysis of outer activity.’” Id. at 70 (quoting Peter H.
Knapp, Purging and Curbing: An Inquiry into Disgust, Satiety and Shame, 144 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 514 (1967)). These are different from “‘fight-flight’ active coping
strategies,” and instead involve “passive coping mechanisms expressed in immobility and
withdrawal associated with” conceding defeat, submitting to the superior party, and seeking a
place to hide. Id. at 72. Similarly, particular hormonal levels and activity associated with
stress regulation appear to be activated and affected by the shame or anticipatory shame
experience. Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 74 (describing the “empirical evidence of
activation of these systems in response to social threat in both humans and other animals, and
associations between biomarkers of these systems and shame experience”). For example, the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) system is associated with three hormones that are
often released in socially stressful situations. Id. at 74 (describing how corticotropin-releasing
hormone (CRH), adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH), and cortisol are responsive to
situations in which the “social self” is threatened). Id. at 74–75. The levels of these hormones
are linked with submissive behavior in other animals. Id. at 76. These behaviors “are often
considered to represent a primitive analogue of submission and shame behaviors in humans,”
thus suggesting “evidence for a connection between shame displays and HPA hormone
activity in both humans and other animals.” Id. (citing Paul Gilbert & Michael T. McGuire,
Shame, Status, and Social Roles: Psychobiology and Evolution, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL
BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 99; Dacher Keltner et al.,
Appeasement in Human Emotion, Social Practice, and Personality, 23 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV.
359 (1997)). Another system that appears to be responsive in shame situations is the
proinflammatory immune system, which is associated with (as the name suggests) an
inflammation response involving heightened immune and repair response. Id. Interestingly,
this system may be more likely to be triggered when others are present than when they are
not, suggesting that it is an individual’s self-conscious awareness of others evaluating her that
triggers the physiological response. Id. at 77. The inflammation response, which is typically
associated with injury or sickness, may help trigger withdrawal in social situations where one
has been threatened or dominated. Id. at 78. “Sickness behavior is thought to represent an
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The purpose of shame behaviors is important on a number of levels.
First, shame behaviors may operate to appease others by demonstrating
39
an acknowledgement of wrongdoing. Such behaviors are informative
(i.e., they demonstrate to the other party the current emotions felt by
such party) and instrumental (i.e., the negative associations with shame
40
behaviors can be a deterrent against improper behavior). Submissive
displays or other appeasement behavior also are evocative in that they
are intended to lead to reconciliation between the shamed party and the
41
aggrieved party.
In other words, the community will forgive, and
refrain from acting aggressively towards, those who display the “proper”
42
shame.
Shame can be understood as an “evolved mechanism,” which
suggests a connection between the physiological and behavioral systems
of humans involved with shame and those of animals acting
43
submissively. For example, self-awareness, which is an important part
adaptive complex of cognitive, affective, and behavioral changes that motivate organisms to
withdraw from the social environment . . . . Social disengagement of this type may also be
adaptive under conditions of social dominance threat to decrease the likelihood of attack
from more dominant animals . . . .” Id. Accordingly, this system’s response “in response to
social-self threat and in conjunction with the experience of shame in humans . . . may also
support similar disengagement and appeasement functions that are adaptive in such
contexts.” Id.
39. Keltner & Harker, supra note 21, at 80 (“An appeasement analysis of shame
suggests that the nonverbal display of shame (1) follows transgressions of social and moral
rules that govern behavior and experience related to the sense of virtue and character, . . . and
(2) is expressed in a distinct display that resembles submissive, appeasement-related behavior,
which (3) restores social relations by reducing aggression and evoking social approach in
observers.”).
40. Id. at 79.
41. Id. at 92. Based on the prosocial aspects of shame, some have advocated the use of
government-sanctioned “shaming” to promote or regulate behavior. See Daniel M. T.
Fessler, From Appeasement to Conformity: Evolutionary and Cultural Perspectives on Shame,
Competition, and Cooperation, in THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND
RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 174, 186–88 (describing the advocates of such an approach). As
Fessler notes, the benefits of any increases in prosocial behavior arising from institutional
shaming “are not free, but rather are accompanied by costs that . . . outweigh them.” Id. at
188. Shaming sanctions may stifle innovation, for example. Id. See generally Joshua D.
Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX L. REV. 539, 540–41 (2009)
(describing the consequences of utilizing shame sanctions as part of a tax regulatory and
punishment regime).
42. Keltner & Harker, supra note 21, at 92–93.
43. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 4; see also BARBALET, supra note 23, at 109 (“With the
extension of the division of labor, and its consequent psychological leveling, each person
might experience shame through the supposed regard of any other, irrespective of rank. The
conformity of all to a general moral order can in principle now . . . be achieved through
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of the shame experience, may in fact have “evolved for the coordination
44
of social behavior.” Shame behaviors may be an evolved response to
particular group situations, where “submissive responses would
45
(usually) turn off or lessen the ‘attack-mode’ of the attacker.” As
ostensibly internal processes: the regard of others in the generation of pride and shame.”);
Fessler, supra note 41, at 176 (describing how “[n]atural selection has presumably favored the
evolution of the capacity to experience emotions that motivate animals to strive for
dominance because access to resources (e.g., food, mates, refuge) is a primary determinant of
survival and reproductive success. Viewed in this light, the aversive shame-like emotion
experienced by subordinate individuals is part of a motivational system that leads actors to
fight for higher rank”); Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Institutions of Justice,
60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1653 (2007) (“Once the intuitions [of justice] exist in a group, actions
that violate others’ intuitions invite censure and punishment.”).
44. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 119; see also Jennifer L. Goetz & Dacher
Keltner, Shifting Meanings of Self-Conscious Emotions Across Cultures: A Social-Functional
Approach, in THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 19, at
153, 154 (“Emotions, therefore, have been shaped by evolutionary forces: they are genetically
encoded and embedded in the human psyche, linked to biological maturation, and involve
coordinated physiological, perceptual, communicative, and behavioral processes that are
meant to produce specific changes in the individual’s interaction with the social and physical
environments.” (citing Dacher Keltner & Jonathan Haidt, Social Functions of Emotions, in
EMOTIONS: CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 192 (Tracy J. Mayne & George A.
Bonanno eds., 2001))); Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 226 (“From the evolutionary
perspective, then, the capacity, or potential, to experience the universal emotions of shame
and guilt are hardwired into the brain’s neural circuitry by natural selection.” (internal
citations omitted) (citing Paul Ekman, All Emotions Are Basic, in THE NATURE OF
EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 15, 17 (Paul Ekman & Richard J. Davison eds.,
1994); Alan J. Fridlund et al., Facial Expressions of Emotion: Review of Literature, 1970–1983,
in NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR AND COMMUNICATION 143 (Aron W. Siegman & Stanley
Feldstein eds., 2d ed. 1987); Harald G. Wallbott & Klaus R. Scherer, Cultural Determinants in
Experiencing Shame and Guilt, in SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SHAME, GUILT, EMBARRASSMENT, AND PRIDE, supra note 36, at 465, 481)); Scheff, supra
note 23, at 400 (“It seems likely . . . that shame has a biological basis and is genetically
programmed . . . .”); Philip E. Tetlock, An Alternative Metaphor in the Study of Judgment and
Choice: People as Politicians, 1 Theory & Psychol. 451, 473 (1991) (arguing that “[p]eople are
in a fundamental sense politicians who depend on the good will of the constituencies to whom
they are accountable”).
45. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 5–6; see also Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 154 (noting
that “given their highly social nature, humans face numerous problems and opportunities
related to functioning within social groups . . . . These are the problems of group governance.
Self-conscious emotions like pride and shame have likely evolved as solutions to them”);
Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 73 (noting how “[r]udimentary forms of shame . . . serve
as evidence of the adaptive function of shame across the phylogenetic hierarchy. Submission
and appeasement behaviors in social animals are central to the communication of the social
status position, a function that serves reproductive and survival needs” (citing PAUL D.
MACLEAN, THE TRIUNE BRAIN IN EVOLUTION: ROLE IN PALEOCEREBRAL FUNCTIONS
(1990))); Schore, supra note 35, at 71 (describing one view of shame as “the organismic
strategy ‘to conserve energies and strive to avoid attention, to foster survival by the risky
posture of feigning death, to allow healing of wounds and restitution of depleted resources by
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acceptance within groups has evolved to be dependent on signals
indicating acceptance or rejection, individuals within the group are
46
extremely sensitive to shame signals.
By being able to experience
shame, individuals are able to comply with social norms (through the
experience of social signals such as shame indicating compliance or noncompliance with those social norms), which advantages them with
47
respect to group inclusion and perpetuation.
Importantly, feelings of shame and related behavioral responses
“may be against the conscious wishes of a person, who may feel
48
overwhelmed by these highly charged internal experiences.” Instead of
a “rational system,” shame appears to implicate an “experiential
system,” which “seems to use heuristics, takes short cuts to reach
conclusions quickly, uses crudely integrated information, is reliant on
affect and how something feels, is preconscious, and possibly relies on
49
earlier experience and conditioned emotional responses.” This is not
to say that the psychological processes or requirements are simple.
Instead, shame and other self-conscious emotions require that brain
functions permit one to perceive one’s self, that others are assessing the
individual, and that there are social norms that determine whether an
50
individual’s acts are appropriate.
To the extent that any of these
immobility’” (quoting WILLIAM E. POWLES, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOMEOSTASIS:
THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHIATRY 213 (1992))).
46. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 99.
47. Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 226; Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 82
(concluding that “[s]hame appears to be part of a psychobiological system designed to alert
organisms to the presence of threat to the social self and to support appropriate behavioral
responses to these threats”); Tracy & Robins, supra note 22, at 4 (describing how “[s]hame
mediates the negative emotional and physical health consequences of social stigma”); Scheff,
supra note 23, at 397 (describing the argument that “shame is the primary social emotion,
generated by the virtually constant monitoring of the self in relation to others. Such
monitoring . . . is not rare but almost continuous in social interaction, and, more covertly, in
solitary thought”).
48. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 105–06; see also BARBALET, supra note 23, at
115 (“A positive evaluation of pride or a negative evaluation of shame has behavioral
consequences in the form of a generalized outcome of conforming behavior.”); Greenwald &
Harder, supra note 29, at 236 (noting how the shame associated with being unconventional
“seems to evoke more a wish to be invisible in front of those who conform more acceptably”);
Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 69 (describing how the “psychobiological responses [of
the shame experience] are associated with specific behavioral reactions (e.g., appeasement,
submission) to such threats [to the social self]”).
49. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 16.
50. Jennifer S. Beer, Neural Systems for Self-Conscious Emotions and Their Underlying
Appraisals, in THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 19,
at 53.
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perceptions can be anticipated and manipulated, one’s conduct may be
51
accordingly affected.
The discussion above is instructive in several ways with respect to
contract preparation. A reaction to a contractual situation (postformation) based upon feelings of shame or anticipation of shame would
be advantageous to the contract preparer if these feelings or anticipation
of feelings lead to seemingly illogical decisions by the other party that
are economically beneficial to the contract preparer. Contract preparers
already should be incentivized to encourage passivity on the part of
contract parties contemplating a breach or challenge to a contract.
Consequently, negative emotions such as shame may be useful to a
contract preparer given the association of such emotions with
submissive behavior. If contracts can help communicate the experience
(actual or anticipated) of shame to the other contracting party, the
contract preparer may be able to enjoy a higher level of contract
compliance than might otherwise be experienced.
An individual may avoid help-seeking behavior, such as sharing her
contractual situation with others, because she is scared of feeling shame
52
once her situation is known. If one believes she is worthy of shame,
either because of her past or contemplated actions, then she will
acquiesce to the superior party, avoid sharing her shame with others,
53
and avoid actions that may trigger future shame feelings.
In
51. See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 30 (2011).
52. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 23–24.
53. The reactions and behaviors associated with negative emotional states are not
perfectly predictable or divisible, of course. Humiliation, for example, may be considered
close to shame and overlap in some instances. Some believe, however, that humiliation is
more directly related to an unjust exercise of power by one over another “purely for [one’s]
own pleasure or purpose.” Id. at 9–10; see also Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at
412 (noting that “people might also be more averse to losses coming from someone who has
promised to confer a benefit (e.g., a promisor) than from someone with a neutral status (a
negligent tortfeasor),” suggesting that contract preparers perhaps should be inclined to
position themselves as benevolent promisors who did all they could to help the other
contracting party rather than harsh-promise enforcers who may be seen as humiliating or
unaccommodating to the other contracting party). If one feels humiliation as opposed to
shame, then one’s behaviors accordingly may be difficult, as “people believe they deserve
their shame; they do not believe they deserve their humiliation.” Gilbert, supra note 22, at 10
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Donald C. Klein, The Humiliation Dynamic: An Overview, 12 J.
PRIMARY PREVENTION 93, 117 (1991)). If humiliated, individuals may respond with “rageful
anger.” Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 236. Thus, if a contractual outcome is
perceived as being “humiliating” versus “shaming,” then the suffering party may choose to
challenge or, at least, not to comply with the contract. By way of contrast, with humiliation,
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contractual terms, she may not contest enforcement of the contract,
strategically default, consult an attorney, or otherwise publicize her
54
situation.
As will be discussed below, contracts appear to have features
designed to trigger shame or the anticipation of shame, whether through
55
the reinforcement of social norms regarding compliance, the inclusion
56
of legal language that triggers deference, or language that implicates
57
the immoral nature of a breach.
C. Shame, Contract, and Moral Promises
This Article suggests that an individual’s perception that a contract
has a “moral” component is important to a self-evaluation of
attractiveness (and avoiding possibly feeling shame) when determining
whether to breach or challenge a written contract. Thus, it is not merely
the act of contractual breach or the situation of suffering damages alone
that results in shame, but it is also the personal belief that one does not
want to be publicly associated with the breach of a “moral” promise and
one perceives that the other party (the “humiliator”) is the cause of the problem, resulting in
a desire for revenge. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 10 (“Humiliation involves: (1) a focus on the
other as bad rather than the self; (2) external rather than internal attributions for harmful
events; (3) a sense of injustice and unfairness; and (4) a burning desire for revenge.”). If, for
example, the contract terms are presented (perhaps hidden) in a manner that is perceived to
be unfair, then perhaps the other party will feel as though the contract preparer was
exercising power unfairly. See id. For example, White notes how “strategic defaulters [of
home mortgages] tend to direct most of the blame, and thus their anger, toward financial
institutions and the government for causing, or allowing, the housing meltdown.” Brent T.
White, Take this House and Shove it: The Emotional Drivers of Strategic Default, 63 SMU L.
REV. 1279, 1305 (2010). Their “anger is only compounded by the sense that their lenders are
giving them the runaround, being callous and uncaring, looking out only for their own
economic self-interest, and refusing to help despite being bailed out by taxpayers
themselves,” and “[t]his anger turns out to be cathartic for many strategic defaulters, relieving
their guilt and justifying a tit-for-tat response to banks.” Id. at 1305–06 (footnotes omitted).
Had lenders been able to alleviate some of this anger (or possibly preclude it through a
different contract), perhaps the incidence of strategic default on home mortgages would have
been lower. If the contract preparer is perceived to be humiliating the other party or
otherwise deemed to be the cause of the unfortunate contract situation, then the other
contracting party’s emotions, beliefs, and behaviors may be different. Thus, this Article
distinguishes between contractual features that may be employed towards a shame-based
reaction, rather than a humiliation-based reaction or other reactions involving an external
attribution of causation.
54. The avoidance of publicity, of course, reinforces social proof regarding contract
compliance. See infra Part II.D.
55. See infra Part II.D.
56. See infra Part II.D.
57. See infra Part II.C.
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58

is struggling to avoid that association.
As seen above, whether one perceives her particular trait or act as
undesirable will depend on the particular social and cultural context in
59
which the decision is being made. The shame “experience” may vary
“[t]o the extent that cultures vary in self-evaluative processes, in the
structure of relationships, or in terms of the values individuals
60
chronically evaluate themselves against.” Thus, “[i]t is likely that what
is undesirable about the self is as much open to social and cultural
61
constructions as what is desirable.” An individual will feel differently
about her contract breach in a culture that values contract compliance as
a moral virtue versus one in which contract compliance is compelled or
62
demanded only by economic necessity or efficiency. This may explain,
for example, the differing cultural beliefs about the morality of the
63
promises contained in a written contract. Contract preparers have a
58. See Fessler, supra note 41, at 181 (“The aversive nature of shame provides an
anticipatory incentive to conform to cultural standards, and to be cognizant of the extent to
which others are aware of any digressions.”); Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 166 (“Selfconscious emotions, in particular shame, guilt, and forms of pride, are intimately intertwined
with moral judgments of harm, character, and responsibility.”).
59. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 118 (noting that “it is not always the case that
traits and behaviors that are stigmatized by one group will result in shame. . . . Tolerance
might relate to group identification—the judgments of others with whom we are, or desire to
be, in close contact may be more powerful”).
60. Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 153; see also ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 51, at
30 (describing Sherif’s experiments and his conclusions that “in the face of uncertainty or
ambiguity people give weight to the judgments of their peers,” but, perhaps more
importantly, “our most basic perceptions and judgments about the world are socially
conditioned and dictated” (citing Muzafer Sherif, An Experimental Approach to the Study of
Attitudes, 1 SOCIOMETRY 90 (1937))); Galbraith & Dean, supra note 18, at B2.
61. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 19; see also Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 118
(noting that “for internalized shame to occur the person has to accept the negative judgments
of others as both true in some measure and undesired”); Lewis, supra note 26, at 126 (“Shame
is elicited when one experiences failure relative to a standard (one’s own or other people’s),
feels responsible for the failure, and believes that the failure reflects a damaged self.”);
Scheff, supra note 23, at 400 (“For adults . . . it also seems certain that shame is not only a
biological process, but also an overwhelmingly social and cultural phenomenon.”).
62. Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 154 (describing how “self-conscious emotions
serve to help the individual act according to group norms, and these group norms vary greatly
across cultures,” which results “in variation in the specific events that tend to elicit selfconscious emotions, in the elaborate concepts around particular self-conscious emotions, and
in the functional value and normative beliefs associated with self-conscious emotions”).
63. Galbraith & Dean, supra note 18 (describing how contractual promises have less
moral significance in particular countries); see also Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 167
(describing a study in which “Chinese participants were less likely to mention violations of
social laws and moral principles as determinants of guilt and shame than were U.S.
participants” (citing Deborah Stipek et al., Testing Some Attribution—Emotion Relations in
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stake in this cultural construction and preparation of the contract to
reinforce the contract as moral promise (or other group norm
incentivizing contract compliance or deference) is one way in which
their responses to this incentive can be examined.
Shavell has described the widely held “view that there is something
wrong with a person’s breaking a contract, or, equivalently, that a
64
person ought to meet his or her contractual obligations.”
As an
example, he cites the Restatement of Contracts, which refers to the
“sanctity of contract and the resulting moral obligation to honor one’s
65
promises.” Contractual promises are seen “as close to, or as even
the People’s Republic of China, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 109 (1989))). Goetz
and Keltner theorize that “members of different cultures should vary in the extent to which
they ‘moralize’ self-conscious emotions, that is, consider them matters of right and wrong, and
as implicating punishment or sanctions.” Id.
64. Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 439 (2006);
Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 406 (“Most people agree that breaking a promise
is immoral. Because the legal construct of contract is tied so closely to the moral notion of a
promise, breach of contract would seem to fall into the same category of moral harm as a
broken promise.”); see also Brent T. White, The Morality of Strategic Default, 58 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 155, 157 (2010), available at http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/discourse/588.pdf (describing one of the primary arguments against strategic default of home mortgages,
which is that “homeowners promised to pay their mortgages when they signed the mortgage
contract, and it would be immoral to break this promise”); Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of
Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (2009) (noting that breaching behavior,
particularly efficient breaches, “is condemned by morality,” and that “[a]lthough the law need
not enforce morality as such, it is problematic when the law, either directly, or by way of the
justifications underlying the law, embraces and encourages immoral action”). Shiffrin goes
on to suggest that “breach of contract may be immoral . . . because it disrespects two features
of the moral significance of agreements,” namely the fact that the parties may especially
prefer (or be motivated by the prospect of) performance and the actual agreement provided
by parties (that is, “the background structure that required agreement as a prerequisite to
performance presupposed that performance could not be demanded upon the proffer of the
performer’s going rate. . . . [I]t matters whether or not she in fact agrees”). Id. at 1566–67.
The disagreement about strategic default illustrates “the failure of either morality or
efficiency as a unifying descriptive or normative theory. . . . The parties’ respective arguments
demonstrate that the question whether a breach of contract is immoral is more sophisticated
than simply asking if someone reneged on a promise.” Meredith R. Miller, Strategic Default:
The Popularization of a Debate Among Contract Scholars, 9 CORNELL REAL EST. REV. 32,
42 (2011).
65. Shavell, supra note 64, at 439–40 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 40 (1981)
(arguing that contracts are “grounded in the primitive moral institution of promising”);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected
Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1428
(2009) (“It is therefore tempting to reach the conclusion that liability in contract for
nonperformance is strict, and is based on policy reasons rather than moral reasons. . . . In the
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indistinguishable from, promises made in every day life,” and those
“promises are statements that most people think they have a moral
66
obligation to honor.” Despite these moral proclamations, contract law
typically permits breach, in the sense that promises made are not
67
generally required to be specifically performed. Instead, contract law
typically allows a person to breach a contract and pay monetary
damages arising from that breach rather than being required to
68
specifically perform the contractual promises.
Put in terms of a
area of nonperformance, law and morality, although not identical, tend to converge rather
than diverge.”). Eisenberg argues that “[t]he efficiency of [the contracting] system rests on a
tripod whose legs are legal remedies, reputational effects, and the internalization of social
norms—in particular, the moral norm of promise keeping. These three legs are mutually
supportive.” Id. at 1430. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 153
(5th ed. 1998) (arguing that contract law should not generally be used “to enforce moral
(insofar as they may be distinct from economic) principles”).
66. Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the
Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1579 (2009). Shavell suggests that
“[w]e are taught from childhood that our promises ought to be kept, and this view is
reinforced throughout our lives,” and, accordingly, “it is natural for us to identify contracts
with the promises that we have learned to treat as having moral valence.” Id.
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (“The traditional
goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor to perform his
promise but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach.”); WilkinsonRyan & Baron, supra note 11, at 406 (noting that “[t]he penalty for breach of contract is
limited, with some exceptions, to money damages in the amount necessary to put the
nonbreaching party in as good a position as he or she would have been in had the contract
been performed” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347)); see also Shavell,
supra note 64, at 440 (noting that “it is manifest that contracts are often disobeyed and that
the law permits this without the imposition of rigorous sanctions”); Shavell, supra note 66, at
1579 (noting that individuals “do not pause to consider that contracts are in fact different
from promises made in social intercourse, and that breaking contracts, unlike breaking
promises, results in the payment of damages”). Moreover, the “moral” nature of contractual
promises is often invoked only when talking about individuals as opposed to corporate or
other entity behavior. See White, supra note 64, at 163 (asking “[w]hy also speak of morality
and social responsibility only when talking about strategic default by homeowners and not by
financial institutions or large corporations”). White suggests that, “if anything, the difference
between commercial and residential mortgage contracts cuts in the other direction—and we
should be more forgiving of less sophisticated residential borrowers.” Id. at 164.
68. See Shavell, supra note 64, at 440 (noting how “[t]he Restatement and commentators
seem to be of the opinion that breach and payment of damages generally are tolerable, and
sometimes even desirable, for practical, economic reasons”); White, supra note 64, at 157
(arguing that “a mortgage contract, like all other contracts, is purely a legal document, not a
sacred promise”); Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 406 (noting that “the law does
not explicitly recognize the moral context of breach of contract. . . . This means that there are
no legal distinctions between cases that elicit very different moral intuitions; morally salient
factors like the motives and intentions of the breacher are legally irrelevant”). Indeed,
Shavell notes that some commentators, such as Holmes, “seemed almost to celebrate the
option to commit breach despite its negative moral aspect.” Shavell, supra note 64, at 440
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mortgage contract, “the lender has contemplated in advance that the
mortgagor might be unable or unwilling to continue making payments
on his mortgage at some point—and has decided in advance what fair
compensation would be” and “wrote that compensation into the
69
contract.” Indeed, in an economic sense, a breach may be a preferred
70
course of action under certain circumstances. If the breaching party
would be benefited more by the breach than the other party will be
71
harmed, then it would be “efficient” for the breach to occur.
Regardless, people in the U.S. generally view breach as an immoral
72
act. Indeed, “most individuals react to breach . . . as having an ethically
(noting Holmes’ idea that “[t]he duty to keep a contract . . . means a prediction that you must
pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else . . . . But such a mode of looking at the
matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the
law as they can” (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV
457, 462 (1897))); see also Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 406 (noting that “[n]ot
only does our legal system appear indifferent to the moral harm of promise breaking, it
permits breachers to profit from a moral violation”). Shavell, though, believes that Holmes
was not ascribing an “ethically neutral” status to a breach, but rather was trying to describe
the treatment of breach under the law. Shavell, supra note 64, at 457. Shavell believes that
Holmes would have believed such an act to be immoral, or at least that “we have no reason to
think that he would not consider it so.” Id. But see Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a
Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (2009) (describing Holmes’ theory of
contract as being a “no fault” theory, which suggests that a “‘breach’ is therefore not a
wrongful act”). Posner suggests that “[t]he law uses moral language mainly because it
supplies a familiar vocabulary in which to discuss duties and entitlements and thus provides
continuity between legal language and the language of everyday life. To take it literally is a
common source of mistakes in legal thinking.” Id. at 1357.
69. White, supra 64, at 158. White articulates that “it’s simplistic to suggest that it’s
always immoral to break a promise. A more accurate description of the social norm is that
one should keep one’s promises unless one has a compelling enough reason not to do so.” Id.
at 159. As argued in this Article, though, contract prepares are incentivized to reinforce the
“simplistic” view of the social norm as all contractual promises are sacrosanct.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (“In general, therefore,
a party may find it advantageous to refuse to perform a contract if he will still have a net gain
after he has fully compensated the injured party for the resulting loss.”).
71. Shavell, supra note 64, at 457 (“Writers on efficient breach have observed that
breach will tend to be efficient under the expectation measure (since a party contemplating
breach will commit it if and only if his benefit would exceed the value of performance to the
other side).”).
72. Id. at 455 (citing survey evidence that individuals “found the simple, unqualified fact
of breach to be unethical on average”); Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 408
(describing the “traditional moral view [that] holds that a contract is a promise, and that
breaking a promise is immoral” (citing FRIED, supra note 65, at 9–17)); see also Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55,
63 (1963) (describing contract and contract law as “often thought unnecessary” in
sophisticated business transactions because of compelling social norms, including that
“[c]ommitments are to be honored in almost all situations”).
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73

incorrect aspect.” Shavell demonstrates, though, that observers’ beliefs
about the morality of a breach can be affected by information regarding
whether the parties did bargain or would have bargained for specific
74
performance upon the occurrence of a particular contingency. From
an attribution standpoint, this makes sense. One is likely to make
negative attributions about someone (or herself) who fails to perform a
promise under certain circumstances that, if discussed, the parties would
75
have agreed was to be specifically performed. If the parties did not
contemplate the circumstances, or perhaps if it is unclear whether the
parties would have required specific performance under such
circumstances, then one might not ascribe as much control or negativity
76
towards the breaching party. The knowledge of what the contract
preparer desired, and the control that the other party has over the
breach, pushes the other party (as well as the adjudicator) to construct a
77
particular attribution of responsibility.
Thus, framing a contractual promise in moral terms may serve to
78
increase contractual compliance by the other party. For example, the
73. Shavell, supra note 66, at 1579.
74. See Shavell, supra note 64, at 452–55; see also Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note
11, at 406. Shavell describes how, if the parties had not discussed whether specific
performance was required (or had agreed that specific performance would not be required)
under a particular set of circumstances, then observers would believe a breach to be more
ethically neutral, while if the parties had discussed the specific circumstances and determined
that performance would be required (or would have so determined if they had discussed it),
then observers judged the breach to be more unethical. Shavell, supra note 64, at 455.
75. See Shavell, supra note 64 at 455 (describing a survey in which the participating
individuals found a breach to be “ethically neutral” when no duty to perform on the contract
arose but “quite unethical” when the breach was one of specific performance).
76. See id.
77. See Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract
Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’
Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 93 (1997) (concluding that the results from the
study conducted “suggest that consumers’ contract schemas may include a general belief that
all contract terms are enforceable”); Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 410
(“Parties’ beliefs about the contract were informed by the terms of the contract itself as well
as their intuitions or beliefs about contracts in general, namely, that they are enforceable as
written.”).
78. Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental Evidence of
Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 88 (2012)
(conducting an empirical study that suggests “a moral framing of contract performance as
living up to one’s promise—as compared to a legal threat, an instrumental reminder, or social
pressure to conform—induced the greatest likelihood of compliance and the greatest relative
quantity of compliance”). In Eigen’s study, the “moral prompt” for contract compliance
reminded participants “that they had made a promise to do something and that they should
therefore live up to their word and do it.” Id.
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contract preparer also may be motivated to prepare the contract in such
a way as to depict the idea that, in as many circumstances as possible,
79
the specific promise made by the other contracting party is sought.
This may explain the regular inclusion of provisions requiring specific
performance in written contracts, even though courts may be reluctant
80
to grant specific performance. A specific performance clause could
convince an individual to believe that the expectation from the other
party is that the promise has to be performed under all circumstances or
else specific performance will be sought, even if it would make sense for
the individual to walk away (if permitted) and compensate the nonbreaching party economically. Second, a specific performance clause
could convince an individual it is the expectation of the state that the
promise has to be performed under all circumstances or else specific
performance will be granted by the state, again regardless of the
advantage that could be achieved if only monetary damages were
awarded. If individuals do not know the frequency with which specific
performance is awarded (as would be expected), the inclusion of such a
clause could be impactful. Similarly, clauses that, in duplicative or
repetitive fashion, emphasize the promises being made by the other
party could be impactful. If people believe that their promises are
specifically being sought and can be specifically enforced, then they may
81
feel different about the immorality of a potential breach.
Similarly, recitals in a written contract could also reinforce the
importance of the promises being given in a particular contract. Recitals
are often used in a preliminary section to a contract in order to give a
82
brief overview of the contract’s purpose and term. These recitals can
indicate to the other party how “fair” the contract preparer has been or
emphasize the benefits under the contract, and how the contract
preparer is seeking particular promises in return from the other contract
79. As an example, one credit card agreement provides, in duplicative fashion, “YOUR
PROMISE TO US. You agree to the terms of this Agreement. You promise to do
everything this Agreement requires of you. . . . You specifically promise to pay all amounts
owed because of transactions made on your Account . . . .” Credit Card Agreement, CREDIT
FIRST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (June 1, 2013), https://www.cfna.com/wps/wcm/connect/migr
ation/www.cfna.com/common/credit+application/credit+card+agreement.
80. Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 271 (1979).
81. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 422 (suggesting that “[p]eople’s moral
intuitions about contract law may make breach less frequent than is economically efficient”).
82. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1385 (9th ed. 2009) (defining recital as “[a] preliminary
statement in a contract or deed explaining the reasons for entering into it or the background
of the transaction, or showing the existence of particular facts”).
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83

party. For example, an employment agreement’s recitals may indicate
the employer’s “desire” to compensate an employee assuming that the
employee fulfills his contractual promises.
A contract could also emphasize the importance of a particular
clause and position of the respective parties, specifically that the
contracting party is “relying” on the promises made by the other
contracting party and would not have entered into the contract “but for”
84
such promises being made. As with recitals, if an individual believes
that the other party was entering into an agreement with a good faith
belief that the promise would be fulfilled, then the individual may be
more reluctant to breach the agreement.
D. Shame, Contract, and Social Norms
One of the predicates to the shame experience is the predilection of
85
individuals to conform to social standards. In order to belong to a
particular community or group, an individual must conform to some
86
extent with the standards of that community or group. By being able
to feel shame, an individual can be deterred from deviating from the
group’s standards, and such conformity can strengthen the bonds of the
87
group and an individual’s place within the group. Shame can thus
83. Zacks, supra note 9, at 187–88, 201.
84. See id. at 197, 201, 203 (suggesting that recitals and “reliance” language can be
utilized to depict a particular story in order to induce the adjudicator to believe that one party
is more culpable than another with respect to particular contractual outcomes).
85. Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 230 (“Human beings demonstrate strong
tendencies to conform to group standards.” (citing Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social
Pressure, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 13 (Elliot Aronson ed., 5th ed. 1988)));
Scheff, supra note 23, at 402 (describing studies of conformity as illustrating “the way in which
emotions may lead to social control” (citing Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and
Conformity: I. A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL.
MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED, no. 9, 1956, at 1)); Tetlock, supra note 44, at 469
(describing how “people are not only expected to act in accord with prevailing norms, they
are also expected to censure those who violate norms”).
86. BAUMEISTER, supra note 20, at 149 (“Culture must find a way to make people want
to respect those rules and do what is right. . . . The first stage relies on the need to belong and
related motives of the concern people have for one another in stable, long-term relationships.
These are mediated by shame and guilt . . . .”); Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 230;
Scheff, supra note 23, at 403 (describing conformity studies that demonstrated “subjects will
find group standards compelling, even though they are exterior and contradictory to their
own individual standards” (emphasis omitted)).
87. Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 231 (noting that a group “member who
anticipates feeling shame upon the violation of group norms will take precautions to avoid
such behavior. The capacity for shame experience, then, and its avoidance through
conformity, can prevent the social rejection or ostracism” arising from not complying with the
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function as a punishment for not conforming one’s behavior to the
88
proper standard. It is not, then, merely being placed in the inferior
position that causes the shame, but also the belief that one is being
placed in the inferior position and does not want to be associated with
89
that position (i.e., suffering that association is the punishment).
Presumably, the conformity pressures as to contract compliance
relate to an individual’s beliefs about the social norms of the group to
90
which the individual belongs or wants to belong. For individuals, this
could be an ethnic group, religious group, social group, or even a belief
about what it means to be an “American.” Because “these standards
may change with time and with culture,” contract preparers have a
vested interest in perpetuating a culture (or the public perceptions of
the culture) that reinforces their ability to enjoy the benefits of contracts
91
made. The issue here is that individuals rely on others to communicate
to them whether shame would be experienced based on particular
92
behavior. Other people, in other words, indicate to each individual
whether he or she is worthy of inclusion or exclusion from the group,
which may include “potent threat signals such as signals of being
93
ignored, rejected, disliked, criticized, excluded, and so forth.”
Similarly, if the (perceived) social standard within the culture is one of

group norm (citing Scheff, supra note 23, at 397)); Scheff, supra note 23, at 396 (arguing that
“the degree and type of deference and the attendant emotions of pride and shame make up a
subtle and pervasive system of social sanctions” that result in conformity).
88. Robinson et al., supra note 43, at 1653 (“Once the intuitions of justice exist, it is
disadvantageous to reject publicly the principles of that system or to behave in ways that
conflict with others’ intuitions.”).
89. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 18 (“Shame cannot, therefore, consist of inferiority alone
but, first, must include some notion of a place or position that one does not want to be in or
an image one does not wish to create and, second, this place or image must be associated with
negative aversive attributes from which one struggles to escape.”). Thus, shame (together
with other self-conscious emotions) may provide “an emotional moral barometer, providing
immediate and salient feedback on our social and moral acceptability.” Tangney et al., supra
note 25, at 22.
90. See Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 230.
91. Lewis, supra note 26, at 127; see also Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 166
(assessing that we should expect more variation in self-conscious emotions across cultures “in
‘complex’ dimensions like attribution of agency or responsibility, fairness or legitimacy, and
norm compatibility or morality”).
92. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 101 (noting that “[s]ocial strategies are
complex because it is other conspecifics who provide the salient signals about which strategy
to use and whether a strategy is working or not”).
93. Id. at 115.

ZACKS-FINAL (6-16-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

720

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/2/2014 5:20 PM

[97:3

contract compliance, then one’s behavior in particular situations can be
94
encouraged or discouraged.
From a contract standpoint, then, individuals may rely on others to
inform them whether shame is the appropriate response to different
contracting behavior. If others indicate that shame is associated with
particular acts (a breach) and that group acceptance is predicated on
refraining from such acts, then individuals may be influenced
95
accordingly. With respect to contracts, individuals may accept their
losses, uneconomical promises, and illegal contractual provisions
because they do not want to feel the shame associated with challenging
96
the social norms. Similarly, individuals that have breached and are
being sued (or have been provided notice that they breached) may be
reluctant to challenge a one-sided or unenforceable contract because
they feel shame, either actual or anticipatory, associated with being an
outlier in that situation. Individuals can make the problem go away by
submitting (paying the damages or complying with the contract), which
often may include simply doing nothing (accepting the contract as it is
without challenge).
One way in which consumer contracts might reinforce a social norm
of contract compliance is through the inclusion of an arbitration
provision in all such contracts (not just a few individuals’ contracts).
Mandatory arbitration already is criticized because of a “lack of public
scrutiny,” meaning that the arbitration proceedings are conducted
97
privately and usually without a written public record. Home lenders,
for example, could reinforce the social norm of contract compliance
(and not defaulting on one’s mortgage) by keeping such lending
practices a secret and addressing disputes concerning those lending
98
practices confidentially. Thus, by shielding contractual disputes from
94. See Lewis, supra note 26, at 127.
95. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 115 (“Social signals, therefore, cue affective
arousal and indicate a need for reparative, defensive, or retaliatory action.”).
96. Id. at 118 (describing “[s]hame [as] a signal that one is misattuned” to her social
role). Shame can influence even those who do not acknowledge the influence of shame. In
other words, shame can induce particular conforming behavior in individuals even though
such individuals do not “experience” shame. Scheff, supra note 23, at 404 (describing
“bypassed shame as a causal element in compelling conformity”).
97. Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1635, 1647.
98. In 2004, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, large mortgage buyers, announced they
would no longer purchase mortgages with such clauses, which deterred the use of arbitration
clauses. Press Release, Fannie Mae, Announcement 04-06, 4 (Sept. 28, 2004), available at
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/announcement/04-06.pdf; see also Freddie Mac Promotes
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public scrutiny, lenders may have benefited from contracts that would
have been contested had more homeowners known generally about the
number of similarly situated or similarly acting (defaulting or litigating)
99
individuals. Such clauses thus obfuscated and distorted what the social
norm actually was with respect to mortgage default or mortgage
litigation and permitted lenders to engage in predatory lending practices
100
without penalty. Many homeowners may have felt anticipatory shame
upon consideration of strategically defaulting on their mortgage or
actual shame upon doing so because the confidential nature of mortgage
litigation precluded them from determining what actual social practice
was. If one perceives social practice inaccurately, then one may feel
anticipatory or actual shame in improper situations and act
inappropriately. The preparation of mortgage contracts may provide a
clear example of such behavior. With respect to home mortgages, the
disputes may eventually become public (when a foreclosure judgment is
enforced and the house is sold), but many contractual disputes would
not involve such a highly visible enforcement mechanism (e.g., a simple
101
monetary judgment).
Similar to the historical use of arbitration clauses in home
mortgages, companies in other industries are using arbitration at an
increased rate in their contracts, including in contracts where the
imposition of the clause is not negotiated or appreciated by the other
102
contracting party at the time of contract formation. Similarly situated

Consumer Choice with New Subprime Mortgage Arbitration Policy, FREDDIE MAC NEWS
ARCHIVE (Dec. 4, 2003), https://web.archive.org/web/20040220070507/http:/www.freddiemac.
com/news/archives/afford_housing/2003/consumer_120403.html (accessed by searching for
URL in the Internet Archive) (announcing that “effective August 1, 2004, it would no longer
invest in subprime mortgages . . . that contain[ed] mandatory arbitration clauses”).
99. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
100. See Press Release, Fannie Mae, supra note 98; see also Freddie Mac Promotes
Consumer Choice with New Subprime Mortgage Arbitration Policy, supra note 98.
101. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 233, 236 (2008) (noting how arbitration is conducted privately and that the awards
“may or may not contain reasons and may or may not be published or be otherwise generally
available”).
102. Id. (noting that “[a]rbitration has become the standard fare in law firms at all levels
and in most fields”); Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1631 (describing how “U.S. companies are
increasingly using form contracts, envelope stuffers, and Web sites to require their consumers,
patients, students, and employees to resolve future disputes through binding arbitration,
rather than in court”). Sternlight notes how arbitration “began to be mandated by a broad
range of industries, including financial institutions (as to personal accounts, house and car
loans, payday loans, and credit cards), service providers (termite exterminators, gymnasiums,
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individuals may be unable to ascertain the social practice (breaching,
challenging, or defending) of others with respect to such contracts and
103
whether such social practices are successful.
Through the silence of
arbitration (emanating from others’ contractual situations), individuals
may be left with the likely conclusions that few others breach, challenge,
104
or defend such contracts or are able to do so successfully. Obviously,
from a conformity standpoint, if contracting parties cannot perceive the
actual practices (people are breaching or challenging these contracts) or
the substantive rights (certain contracts may be rightly challenged) of
similarly-situated parties, then this lack of transparency potentially
distorts the market for one-sided or unenforceable contracts. Either
through voluntary settlement or arbitration proceedings, contract
preparers would engage in the practice most likely to keep any

telephone companies, and tax preparers), and sellers of goods (mobile homes, computers, and
eBay).” Id. at 1638 (footnotes omitted).
103. Carbonneau, supra note 101, at 266 (concluding that law “suffers because legal
norms are no longer elaborated on a public record”). For example, confidentiality provisions
routinely contained in settlement agreements concerning civil litigation (concerning torts
committed by corporate actors) also serve to prevent similarly situated (wronged) individuals
from becoming aware of their remedies. Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out
of the Shadows: Information about Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV.
663, 676 n.51 (2001) (finding that confidentiality provisions are routinely included in
settlement agreements because “[d]efendants fear that disclosure of settlement information
will create a sense of entitlement among potential plaintiffs and therefore encourage lawsuits
by people who otherwise would not feel they had suffered a harm, or would not expect money
from the defendant for their harm”); Alison Lothes, Comment, Quality, Not Quantity: An
Analysis of Confidential Settlements and Litigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
433, 474–75 (2005) (suggesting that confidentiality provisions are routinely included because
“quantitative publication of settlement amounts encourages frivolous lawsuits, imposing costs
on the public and defendants and primarily benefiting fraudulent plaintiffs”). Conversely,
class actions litigated in public may permit similarly situated individuals to become aware that
they have been wronged or otherwise have valid claims or defenses. See Joshua D. Blank &
Eric A. Zacks, Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the Class Action Restriction on
the Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 10–14 (2005) (discussing generally
the benefits to the poor of class action litigation).
104. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1674 (noting that arbitration’s “secret proceedings
inherently threaten a society’s ability to enforce its norms”); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon,
The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J.
1, 115 (2004) (“The problem of pluralistic ignorance and the motive for group coherence
distorts many social norms and would seem to have significant implications for policy and
law. . . . It is also behind the pervasive, dysfunctional classroom dynamic in which students do
not ask questions because they assume that others’ silence suggests they are themselves alone
in their ignorance, thus contributing to the silence that encourages others to do the same.”).
In this Article, I am not seeking to describe how norms should be enforced but instead to
describe how norms can be portrayed falsely to the benefit of one party.
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challenges or unfavorable decisions confidential from others who might
be able to utilize such information to realize their own rights.
The resulting conforming behavior is related to the possibility of
stigma, which is the “public mark” or distinction suggesting that a
105
person is not socially acceptable.
If the community characterizes
individuals that breach their contract as “deadbeats,” perhaps others
will be accordingly deterred from acting in such a way to avoid the
106
shame associated with such a label.
Thus, individuals anticipate the
“punishment” of shame (arising from possible future conduct) based on
prior experiences with similar actions or events where shame was
107
experienced.
Arbitration provisions also may encourage individuals to anticipate
being stigmatized, particularly where such individuals are unable to
perceive the actions of similarly situated individuals. Similarly, in the
mortgage context, “[t]he stigma against default apparently remains
108
robust,” which deters strategic default. The deterrent effect of shame
and contractual features that reinforce a social norm of contract
compliance may, in fact, explain why few individuals breach contracts
where the financial advantages of doing so outweigh the financial
109
disadvantages.
Thus, people generally strategically default on their
mortgages only when their shame is “overwhelmed” by their economic

105. Lewis, supra note 26, at 126. Lewis notes that “[f]rom the point of view of
standards, it is quite clear that the stigma that an individual possesses represents a deviation
from the accepted standards of the society; this deviation may be in appearance, in behavior,
or in conduct.” Id. at 127.
106. See Tetlock, supra note 44, at 458 (“The cognitive research program tells us that
people use few items of information in making up their minds; the social contingency model
tells us that subjective estimates of the reactions of those to whom they are accountable will
be prominent among those few items of information considered.”).
107. Tangney et al., supra note 25, at 21–22. Lewis notes that “[s]tigma reflects the idea
of difference and how difference shames us and those we know” and feeling stigmatized
arises “through one’s interactions with other people or through one’s anticipation of
interactions with other people.” Lewis, supra note 26, at 129, 131.
108. White, supra note 53, at 1288. White describes how “homeowners who strategically
default sometimes report being shunned by others.” Id. Similarly, defaulters typically are
reluctant to share information regarding their defaults to anyone other than close associates
or neighbors in a similar situation. Id. at 1290.
109. See White, supra note 8, at 971–72 (describing “underwater” homeowners who
continue to make their mortgage payments despite having no prospect of regaining their
losses).

ZACKS-FINAL (6-16-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

724

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/2/2014 5:20 PM

[97:3

110

or other circumstances.
Even though individual homeowners often
would be better off by “walking away” from their home mortgages,
individuals are induced in part by a feeling of shame (or anticipatory
feeling of shame) to continue paying their mortgage or risk being
111
labeled a “deadbeat.”
As long as the contract (in addition to other
social communication) continues to suggest “personal responsibility”
and moral promises, then individuals may feel anticipatory shame upon
112
contemplating a breach of or contesting the contract.
This suggests
that, notwithstanding the contractual ability to breach one’s mortgage,
contract preparers and others have been able to maintain or at least
113
reinforce moral norms about the sanctity of promise.
By contrast, if the “stigma” is removed from a particular type of
114
behavior, one could expect an increase in that behavior. For example,
homeowners were found to act “strategically” in response to a lender’s
115
Following the
announcement of a new loan modification program.
lender’s announcement, there was a significant increase in the number
of defaults by individuals who did not need to default for financial
distress reasons and who otherwise would not have been expected to
116
default.
One explanation for this behavior could be that the lender
removed the stigma associated with defaulting on one’s home loan. By
acknowledging its willingness to accommodate those stuck in
110. White, supra note 53, at 1289 (describing how homeowners may strategically
default “not because [they are] shameless but because circumstances overwhelm their shame,
driving them to make decisions that they would not have made otherwise”).
111. White, supra note 8, at 971–72, 999 (suggesting that “most underwater homeowners
choose not to default as a result of two emotional forces: (1) desire to avoid the shame or guilt
associated with foreclosure; and (2) fear over the perceived consequences of foreclosure”).
112. Id. at 1007.
113. This is not to say that the contract preparation is the exclusive mode of reinforcing
such norms. Lenders, government actors, and others all have undertaken numerous actions,
at all stages of the contractual relationship, to communicate and reinforce the notion that one
should pay one’s mortgage no matter what the circumstances. Id. at 997 (“[T]he predominant
message of political, social, and economic institutions in the United States has functioned to
cultivate fear, shame, and guilt in those who might contemplate foreclosure.”).
114. See Lewis, supra note 26, at 127 (discussing how stigma “represents a deviation
from the accepted standards of the society; this deviation may be in appearance, in behavior,
or in conduct”). Lewis also suggests that individuals “judge whether or not their behavior
meets or does not meet these standards.” Id.
115. Christopher Mayer et al., Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence
from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide 12, 31 (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Law & Econ.
Studies, Working Paper No. 404, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=1836451.
116. Id. at 31, 34.
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uneconomical loans (and presumably acknowledging, if implicitly, the
lender’s blame, in part, for the borrower’s situation), the lender may
have signaled to borrowers that it was no longer shameful to default
upon one’s mortgage.
Consequently, aggressive individuals can be pacified and silenced
(through settlement, waivers of contractual rights, or the confidentiality
of arbitration proceedings), and passive individuals can be encouraged
117
to defer to the status quo of silence and contractual deference.
For
example, with respect to consumer transactions, sellers may renegotiate
a contract after the fact in order to avoid adverse publicity associated
118
with unhappy consumers or a one-sided contract.
It has been
suggested that assertive consumers will be rewarded (either by a waiver
of the contract’s terms or otherwise), while “aggrieved consumers who
119
do not display persistence and assertiveness will bear losses.” In other
words, sellers are incentivized to induce passivity on the part of
120
consumers with respect to “negative” contract actions.
Thus, at the
point of ex post contracting behavior (and the contemplation of a
breach), the other contracting party likely is faced with a written

117. Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 7, at 207 (describing how, in such instances,
“all consumers will be offered biased, unfair terms, and only assertive marginal consumers
will get their way, after negotiating their [standard form contracts]”). Accordingly, “whereas
it is basically true that contracting parties do not negotiate [standard form contracts] ex ante,
actual contracting around the [standard form contract’s] content is more likely to take place
at the ex post stage.” Id. at 208. Interestingly, contract preparers may be unable to induce
other contract parties not to read their contract and simply defer to the existing relationship.
At least in the standard form contract context, the legal jargon and visual features (such as
font size) of a written contract were not important factors in determining whether a consumer
would read the contract after the fact. Id. at 225. That is not to say, however, that the
presentation and features of the written contract would not affect the actual contracting
behavior of the parties after they read the contract. Id. at 226.
118. Id. at 207 (noting that “sellers fear undermining their own reputations by insisting
on the language of one-sided contracts”).
119. Id. This practice is called “ex post discrimination.” Id.
120. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 422 (“If parties think that a contract is a
promise to perform, and not simply to confer a benefit as valuable as performance, they may
be less likely to breach at all.”). Indeed, only certain types of individuals may be inclined to
challenge a contract. Becher and Unger-Aviram note the argument that “people, and
especially women, fear the negotiation procedure” associated with challenging an existing
contract. Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 7, at 225 n.59. If so, then such individuals may
forego reading the contract and attempting to renegotiate, even if such activities would be
beneficial. Id.; see also id. at 206 (describing the two main reasons that consumers may read
contracts after formation as to develop familiarity with rights and obligations generally (so as
to be able conform conduct accordingly), as well as to develop a strategy to modify the
contract after it has been executed).
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contract that contains unfavorable substantive terms in the event of a
breach, and such terms are likely presented in a manner designed to
deter breach.
From the contract preparer’s standpoint, then, the actual results in
arbitration may be less important than the social messaging and
121
deterrence that occurs from the silence of all such proceedings. One’s
inability to perceive that contracts are being challenged and could and
should be challenged suggests that contract preparers can overreach.
Contract preparers are also then permitted to deal with similarly
situated individuals differently in order to maintain this silence.
III. COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACT DESIGN
In addition to triggering particular negative emotions such as shame,
contract preparers may prepare contracts designed to exploit particular
cognitive biases and judgment heuristics of the other contract party with
respect to post-formation behavior. After identifying particular biases
and heuristics, this Part will examine particular contract provisions that
may anticipate and manipulate such biases and heuristics.
Individual contracting parties’ contracting behavior at the time of
contract formation often does not fit within the standard rational-actor
model, which may be attributed to the “limits of cognition,” including
“limits based on bounded rationality and rational ignorance, limits
122
based on disposition, and limits based on defective capability.”
Previous critiques of the rational-actor model with respect to individual
contracting behavior generally focus on the period during which the
123
contract is executed or negotiated. This Article examines these same
cognitive limitations in the context of individual contracting behavior
after the contract has been executed, particularly with respect to
decisions concerning whether to breach or challenge a contract.
121. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1672 (concluding that “[p]rivate proceedings and
private awards offer no opportunity for nondisputants to learn from what happened”).
122. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 213 (1995); see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (describing limits on individual cognitive
abilities and the coping mechanisms individuals use that may cause behavior to “differ[] in
systematic ways from that predicted by the standard economic model of unbounded
rationality”).
123. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1107–08 (discussing homeowner contracting
behavior at the time of home mortgage contract execution); Robert Prentice, Contract-Based
Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 374
(discussing investor contracting behavior at the time of investment contract execution).
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Moreover, if such behavior suggests that individuals are not acting
completely rationally at such times, then one should expect contract
preparers to anticipate such irrational behavior and coordinate their
contracts to encourage particular decisions.
A. Information Gathering Strategies
Individuals often do not act completely rational due to the
124
unavailability of information or incomplete information processing.
This is because individuals are concerned with finding merely
125
“satisfactory” rather than “optimal” decisions.
Accordingly,
individuals may engage in limited information searches (perhaps based
on the relative perceived costs and benefits of such a search) or utilize
limited decision-making processes (perhaps relying on “rule-of-thumb
126
heuristics”).
For example, the amount of information gathering
required in order to evaluate or negotiate a liquidated damages
provision and navigate the “complexity of determining the application
of a liquidated damages provision to every possible breach scenario is
127
often likely to exceed actors’ calculating capabilities.”
With respect to the decision to breach a contract after the contract
has been executed, one may similarly expect individuals to do a limited
or no search with respect to similarly situated individuals (e.g., “What
have others done in my situation?” or “Have others ‘gotten away’ with a
breach?”). This may result in a perception that few other individuals in
a similar situation have chosen to breach or have “gotten away” with a
breach, thus indicating that the appropriate course of action is to comply
with the contract.
124. Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 214 (“Accordingly, human rationality is normally
bounded by limited information and limited information processing.”); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Moral Heuristics 2–3 (U. Chi. John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper Series, No.
180, 2003), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/180.crs_.moral_.pdf (arguing
“that moral heuristics play a pervasive role in moral, political, and legal judgments, and that
they produce serious mistakes. . . . And if good heuristics misfire in the factual domain, they
will inevitably do so in the domains of morality and law as well”).
125. Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 214.
126. Id. at 215 (describing “rule-of-thumb heuristics (decision rules)” such as following
or imitating a neighbor’s practice); Chris Guthrie, Principles of Influence in Negotiation, 87
MARQ. L. REV. 829, 830 (2004) (discussing “Cialdini’s principles of influence [as operating]
like these heuristics and biases (though they are ‘motivational’ rather than ‘cognitive’ in
origin). When deciding whether to comply with a request, individuals generally look for
simple cues . . . .” (citing ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE (4th
ed. 2001))).
127. Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 227.

ZACKS-FINAL (6-16-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

728

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/2/2014 5:20 PM

[97:3

This Article suggests that contract preparers anticipate such
“bounded rationality” with respect to ex post decision-making and
prepare contracts to exploit individual limits on information gathering
128
and processing.
Thus, the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings
(compelled by the arbitration provision in the contract) may result in
less information about similarly situated individuals being available
when a contracting party is determining whether to breach or challenge
129
a contract. By obfuscating the existence of contract disputes, contract
preparers may encourage incorrect perceptions by the other contract
party that her “neighbors” do not breach or challenge contracts, even if
in fact they do (but are “hidden” from view because of arbitration’s
130
confidentiality).
Thus, if an unenforceable contract provision is
included in a contract but is never challenged in public, an individual
contracting party is unable (even if desired) to engage in “optimal”
substantive decision-making, and given the proclivity for merely
“satisfactory” substantive decision-making, the contracting party may
incorrectly determine that the “satisfactory” decision is not to challenge
131
the provision in question. For example, people often believe that “the
parties [are] morally bound by the specific language of the contract,
even when contract law says that the exculpatory clause is
132
unenforceable or that the promisor can pay rather than perform.”
This belief may be influenced by the lack of knowledge regarding
133
whether such provisions can be or are challenged.
Thus, contract
preparers may purposefully conceal or fail to disclose information to

128. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 3, at 635, 691 (arguing that “the presence of unyielding
cognitive biases makes individual decisionmakers susceptible to manipulation by those able to
influence the context in which decisions are made. . . . [W]e believe that market outcomes
frequently will be heavily influenced, if not determined, by the ability of one actor to control
the format of information, the presentation of choices, and, in general, the setting within
which market transactions occur”).
129. See Zacks, supra note 15, at 1497.
130. See id. at 1497–98.
131. Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 214 (describing the difference between “optimal
substantive decisions” and “satisfactory substantive decisions” (emphasis omitted)).
132. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 423.
133. See id. at 422 (“[I]ndividuals who are not familiar with the rule of expectation
damages . . . . believe that they are legally (and morally) obligated to perform. Researchers
have found that people believe that exculpatory clauses in contracts mean that they cannot
seek compensation.” (citing Stolle & Slain, supra note 77, at 91)).
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exploit an individual’s already limited information gathering and
134
processing.
B. Framing
Individuals also utilize judgment heuristics that deviate from a
135
model of rationality and “yield systematic errors.”
For example,
individuals’ choices may also be influenced by the framing of the
136
outcomes arising from each choice. If an option is framed in terms of
possible gains, individuals prefer the “sure gain” of a lower value to the
“chance” with a higher value, while if an option is framed in terms of
possible losses, individuals prefer the “chance of loss” with a higher
137
value rather than the “sure loss” of a lower value.
In other words,
“most people are risk-averse when contemplating gains, but risk138
Individuals also suffer more
preferring when contemplating losses.”
regret from a loss suffered than the happiness (or utility) enjoyed from
139
an equivalent benefit. Consequently, the “anticipation of regret over
actions that yield disappointing results is usually stronger than the
140
anticipation of rejoicing over actions that yield desirable results.”
Such judgment heuristics (utilized by non-drafting parties) may
explain why many “fee-shifting” provisions are drafted as they are. Feeshifting provisions typically provide that in the event of a dispute
regarding the contract, the losing party will be obligated to pay the
141
winning party’s costs and fees associated with litigating the dispute. A
contract preparer, in order to frame the contract in the most
134. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 3, at 635 (“Once one accepts that individuals
systematically behave in nonrational ways, it follows from an economic perspective that
others will exploit those tendencies for gain.”).
135. Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 218.
136. Id. at 218–19 (describing the failure of “invariance,” which suggested that “a
decisionmaker’s preference between two options should not depend on how a choice is
characterized and presented”).
137. Id. at 219.
138. Id.
139. Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological
Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1620 (1998) (“Loss
aversion theory posits that the utility consequences to individuals of suffering a ‘loss’ from a
reference point will be greater than an equivalent ‘gain’ from the same reference point. If
losses loom larger than gains, it follows logically that anticipated regret would loom larger
than anticipated rejoicing.” (footnote omitted)).
140. Id. at 1619.
141. Nicholas N. Nierengarten, Fee-Shifting: The Recovery of In-House Legal Fees, 39
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227, 227–28 (2012).
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advantageous manner, could include a provision that does not indicate
the “possibility” of the other party winning but instead include a
declarative statement to the effect that: “If you breach this contract, you
will be responsible for all of the costs and fees we incur in connection
with enforcing this contract.”
By framing the possibility of paying for the other party’s costs and
fees as a guaranteed loss rather than a chance of loss, contract preparers
142
may be able to deter more breaches.
If the fees were portrayed as
being conditional, then perhaps a party would choose the “riskier”
option of a breach that possibly would result in damages (the lost
amount due under the contract), plus possible fees and costs.
Additionally, an arbitration provision that maintains the confidentiality
of the actual results of any similar disputes and the frequency of such
disputes may distort the perception of whether such fees will be and are
collected.
If, on the other hand, the provision provided that: “If there is a
contract dispute, the losing party will be required to pay the winning
party’s costs and fees incurred in connection with the dispute,” then the
other contracting party may consider the possible payment of the other
party’s fees and costs as a contingency. The provision does not include
or describe a guarantee that such fees and costs would be paid, but
instead provides for such payment only if the other contract party was
the losing party in litigation. If, when deciding whether to breach a
contract, one will be deciding between a sure loss (complying with the
contract) and a possible future loss (possibly being forced to pay for
breaching the contract, including the other party’s costs and fees), then
the contracting party may choose to breach (as risk-preferring when
143
dealing with potential losses).
If the latter is characterized in the
contract not as a possibility but instead as a certainty, then the feeshifting (and indemnity) provisions may deter an individual from

142. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 3, at 685 (“Whether something is coded as a loss, thus
raising the possibility of loss aversion, depends on how it is framed. In this respect, one may
usefully conceive of framing effects as a mechanism for eliciting other cognitive biases—in
other words, a mechanism for manipulating individual perceptions and decisions.”).
143. See Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 219.
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144

breaching. The framing of the contract, then, may have implications
145
beyond representing the bargain at the time of formation.
Contracts framed in terms of a loss (as opposed to a gain) can also
146
lead to increased efforts on the part of the other party. For example,
an employment contract that characterizes compensation as a wage plus
a contingent bonus (if certain thresholds are met) may induce less effort
than an employment contract that describes compensation as a wage less
a deduction (if certain thresholds are not met), even though the
147
compensation is the same under each contract. It may be, then, “the
loss frame communicates a stronger sense of the default expectation of
148
the party offering the contract.” Thus, framing contingent amounts as
a loss appears to “threaten a ‘punishment,’” suggesting to the individual
that “expectations to meet the threshold are higher under the loss frame
149
than under the gain frame.”
This may explain why contract preparers may include late fees or
termination fees rather than bonuses (presumably as a reduction to the
required payment or credited towards the next payment) for paying on
time or not terminating before a certain date. In each case, the total
amount to be paid under a contract is the same, but contract preparers
can expect “better” performance from the other party if all “extra”
150
amounts under the contract are characterized as penalties or losses.
The expectation, then, under the loss-framing contract, is paying “less”
151
This is a different scenario, of course,
(and avoiding the late fees).

144. See id.
145. Id. at 220 (describing how “failure of invariance is both pervasive and robust”
(quoting Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOL. 341, 343 (1984))).
146. Richard R. W. Brooks et al., Framing Contracts: Why Loss Framing Increases
Effort, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 62, 63 (2012).
147. Id. The fixed wage under the second contract would be higher by the amount of
the possible deduction and the deduction would be equal to the possible bonus under the first
contract.
148. Id. at 74. Brooks et al. conclude that the loss frame sets an expectation “that
cognitively induces subjects to invest more effort.” Id. at 81.
149. Id. at 65. Brooks et al. suggest that this makes sense given that “a reward is often
viewed as a kind of recognition for voluntary overperformance, while a punishment is more
akin to a sanction for not meeting the client’s expectation.” Id.
150. See id. at 81 (citing evidence suggesting that “framing contracts in a manner that
makes ‘losses’ more salient than ‘gains’ leads to greater effort” (citing Tanjim Hossain & John
A. List, The Behavioralist Visits the Factory: Increasing Productivity Using Simple Framing
Manipulations, 58 MGMT. SCI. 2151 (2012))).
151. See id.
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than a contract in which a concrete “bonus” is possible, but one would
152
expect the same effect to be present.
Contract preparers invite the
conclusion that performance is expected, that timely performance is
expected, and that failure to meet these expectations will be sanctioned.
Characterized as such in the contracts, one would expect higher
compliance rates than if the contracts required higher payments but
promised a “reward” or “bonus” for performing as and when required
under the contract.
C. Regret Theory
Individuals’ behavior often is influenced by the desire to avoid
regret, which can lead to an individual maintaining current behavior or
153
avoiding any act that could lead to regret.
Individuals typically feel
more regret from a loss arising from engaging in a new activity than
154
from a loss arising from being passive. Contracting parties accordingly
may rather suffer a loss from complying with an unfavorable contract
than suffer an equivalent loss by challenging or breaching the contract.
Thus, individuals may be inclined to continue performing under
unfavorable contracts for fear of the consequences, however unlikely,
that may arise if the individual breached or challenged the contract.
This tendency also can be exploited by contract preparer, who can
emphasize the losses and costs (e.g., late fees, litigation costs, and

152. Id. at 65–66 (describing the possible endowment effect associated with the
description of a contingent “bonus”).
153. Tetlock, supra note 44, at 472 (describing how “people tend to avoid decisions in
which they could appear after the fact to have made the wrong choice, even if in advance the
decision appeared correct given the information available at the time”); see also Zacks, supra
note 9, at 176 (“The status quo bias describes the tendency of individuals to prefer the status
quo (the contract as presented) even if the status quo does not efficiently allocate
rights . . . .”).
154. Tetlock, supra note 44, at 472 (“[P]eople feel greater regret for bad outcomes that
are the result of new actions than for similar outcomes resulting from inaction.”); Korobkin,
supra note 139, at 1613 (“Substantial experimental evidence suggests that individuals predict
that greater regret will follow an action that leads to an undesirable result than a failure to act
that leads to the same undesirable result.”); see also Chris Guthrie, Better Settle than Sorry:
The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 72 (positing
“that litigants seek to make litigation decisions that minimize the likelihood they will
experience postlitigation regret”); Zacks, supra note 15, at 1476 (arguing that “[t]he tendency
to experience more regret from negative situations resulting from actions an individual takes
rather than inaction also may explain [credit card holders’] reluctance to negotiate credit card
agreements”); Zeelenberg, supra note 29, at 329 (explaining how “we may avoid deciding as a
consequence of anticipated regret. . . . simply in order to avoid making the wrong decision”).
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foreclosure) associated with not choosing the “default” of complying
155
with the contract.
If people are reluctant to breach or challenge a contract because of a
preference for ending up in an equally bad situation from inaction
(complying with the contract) rather than action (breaching or
challenging the contract), then contract preparers should be incentivized
156
to exploit this tendency.
For example, under many home mortgage
contracts, a defaulting homeowner will be responsible for any deficiency
between the amount for which the home sells in foreclosure and the
157
loan amount, plus fees and costs. Most lenders, however, do not seek
to recover such deficiency amounts, presumably because of the cost or
158
unlikelihood (due to the debtor’s inability to pay) of collection. The
contractual right to collect this deficiency nevertheless may serve as a
deterrent to those contemplating a breach because people anticipate the
159
regret that would be experienced if such deficiency were enforced.
In other words, the prospect of suffering the losses arising from a
breach (the deficiency judgment, plus costs and fees) may deter
someone from breaching, even if the likelihood of such losses being
155. Korobkin, supra note 139, at 1616 (“The link between norm theory and the
tendency of individuals to favor choices correlated with inaction over action is the prediction
that actions are more mutable [more abnormal or exceptional] than failures [to] act” and thus
more “likely to be perceived as the cause of the negative event.”). Korobkin also describes
how people associate additional personal control with action as compared with inaction, and
“[t]he thought that something bad happened when something good could have happened
instead is likely to be more distressing when the actor also thinks he could have done
something to avoid the negative outcome.” Id. at 1617. This may also explain the high costs
of arbitration, which can act as an additional deterrent to defying the contract. See, e.g.,
Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 371 (N.C. 2008) (discussing the
costs associated with arbitration that are not incurred in regular litigation proceedings).
156. See Korobkin, supra note 139, at 1617.
157. Jay Adkisson, Foreclosure, Deficiency Judgments and the Perils of Anti-Deficiency
Statutes, FORBES.COM (June 24, 2012, 12:49 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/20
12/06/24/foreclosure-deficiency-judgments-and-the-perils-of-anti-deficient-statutes/; see also
Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1105 (noting that foreclosure fees and dispute resolution fees can be
significant).
158. Luigi Guiso et al., Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Default on Mortgages 3
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 15145, 2009), available at http://www.nber.or
g/papers/w15145 (noting that “the cost of legal procedures is sufficiently high that most
lenders are unwilling to sue a defaulted borrower unless he has significant wealth besides the
home”); Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1135–37 (noting the tremendous losses arising for lenders
in the event of a foreclosure).
159. Tetlock, supra note 44, at 470–71 (“Accountable decision-makers are more likely to
anticipate how difficult it would be to justify choosing an option that led to a worst-case
outcome. One would stand accused of recklessness.”).
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160

realized is small. The severity of a contractual outcome arising from
breach, rather than its probability, may prove vital to a contract
161
preparer’s ability to maintain contract compliance. The prospect of a
severely negative outcome may consequently impact the experience of a
contracting party’s anticipatory regret and influence her contracting
162
behavior.
D. Social Proof
Individuals tend to rely on social proof when encountering a new or
uncertain situation and when there are perceived similarities between
163
themselves and others who have encountered the same situation.
Most individuals presumably do not (consciously) breach many of their
contracts, and material contract breaches are perhaps even more rare
(such as deciding whether to default on a home mortgage), so individual
contracting parties may be expected to rely on social proof when faced
with such a novel situation.
Similarly, many individuals would likely perceive similarities
between themselves and other individual contracting parties with
respect to most consumer transactions. If one’s neighbors do not default
on a home mortgage, this may be fairly convincing. In order to take
advantage of social proof, the contract preparer must reinforce the
social norms regarding compliance with a contract’s terms as written
164
(and not contesting an unfavorable contract).
Social conformity can
be reinforced through the silence of litigation disputes (through the
confidentiality of arbitration) or negotiations and confidential
165
settlements with the few individuals who do challenge a contract.
If
these social norms are not perceived by the other contracting party, or
160. But see Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1127 (suggesting that lenders should want to hide
fees in order to induce an “imperfectly rational borrower . . . to underestimate the total cost
of the loan”).
161. See Prentice, supra note 123, at 362–63; see also, e.g., White, supra note 8, at 972.
162. See, e.g., White, supra note 8, at 972.
163. Guthrie, supra note 126, at 831–32; see also supra text accompanying note 17.
164. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 116 (rev.
ed. 2007) (describing how our perception of the behavior of others in a particular situation
influences our belief about what the proper behavior is); HERBERT W. SIMONS & JEAN G.
JONES, PERSUASION IN SOCIETY 215 (2d ed. 2011) (defining as plurastic ignorance “[t]he
assumption that individuals make that ‘because nobody is concerned, nothing is wrong’”);
Scheff, supra note 23, at 396 (describing how “[o]ur thoughts and perceptions of social
expectations only set the stage for social control”). For more information, see supra Parts
II.B and C for a discussion of social standards and their relationship to inducing shame.
165. See supra Part II.D.
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are weakened through other individuals who do not abide by them, then
the contract preparer risks additional losses on his contracts through
strategic defaults and other litigation disputes.
Empirical evidence with respect to strategic defaults of home
mortgages supports the above description. For example, “homeowners
who are personally acquainted with someone who has strategically
166
defaulted are much more likely to default than those who are not.”
This suggests that lenders should be motivated to keep the occurrence
of strategic default and related foreclosure proceedings as confidential
as possible. Similarly, homeowners that did not share the moral belief
167
that default is immoral were more likely to default strategically.
As
discussed above, until 2004, most lenders included arbitration provisions
in their subprime mortgages, which could have had the muting effect
168
with respect to the occurrence of breach.
Of course, the
confidentiality of arbitration does not preclude the communication of
strategic default by one individual to another, but it could dampen the
general public’s awareness of such acts. In fact, most Americans believe
169
that defaulting on one’s mortgage is immoral.
It may be easier to keep the incidence of breaches and strategic
defaults (or other contractual challenges) “quiet” with respect to
contracts that do not include property as significant and visible as a
house. With respect to breaching one’s home mortgage, eventually the
breach will come to light once the house is sold after foreclosure
proceedings commence. With respect to other contracts, it may be
impossible for others to detect that one breached her contract and was
forced to pay (or not forced to pay) damages as a result.
166. White, supra note 53, at 1285; Luigi Zingales, The Menace of Strategic Default, 20
CITY J. 47, 50 (2010) (“Perceived social norms also seem to affect the propensity to walk
away [from one’s mortgage]: knowing somebody who defaulted strategically, or living in an
area where many people have done so, makes a person much more likely to declare his
willingness to follow suit.”); Guiso et al., supra note 158, at 21 (“The most important barriers
to strategic default seem to be moral and social.”).
167. White, supra note 53, at 1285.
168. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
169. White, supra note 53, at 1287–88 (noting a 2009 study that “eighty-one percent of
Americans believed that it was morally wrong to default on one’s mortgage” (citing Guiso et
al., supra note 158, at 10, 21)). White cites a similar study finding that “eighty-five percent of
Americans believed it was morally wrong even if one faced financial difficulties . . . that made
it difficult to pay one’s mortgage.” Id. at 1288 (citing News Release, Fannie Mae, New
Nationwide Survey Provides Comprehensive Look at Sentiment Toward Housing (Apr. 6,
2010), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/about-us/media/corporate-news/2010/498
9.html).
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E. Authority
Contract preparers can also utilize the influence of authority or the
appearance of authority to induce the other contract parties to comply
170
with the contract.
Contracts can appear authoritative through their
171
For example, the mere inclusion of
official and legal appearance.
exculpatory clauses, even if unenforceable, “may deter consumers from
172
pursuing their rights and seeking compensation.”
Similarly, the
contract preparer may perhaps appear as an authority or powerful figure
in the contract through the use of a defined term (“Bank,” “Employer,”
or “Company”), while the other party is diminished similarly through a
particular label (“Borrower,” “Employee,” the party’s last name, or
173
“Customer”). The labels inform as to the relative authority of the two
174
parties: the “Bank” is more of an authority than the “Borrower.” The
“Borrower” may not, then, be inclined to challenge the “Bank’s”
authority to charge particular fees or to consider breaching the contract.
Similarly, the use of all capital letters or boldface type with respect to
particular contractual disclaimers or waivers may induce the other
contracting party to believe that she is in a subordinate position and is,
175
to some extent, being yelled at or scolded.
Cognitive biases, reinforced by anticipatory regret, lead individuals
“to imbue the form contract that they are presented by form givers with
a presumption of legitimacy and fairness that they are hesitant to
176
challenge.”
This Article extends this argument to post-formation
170. SIMONS & JONES, supra note 164, at 138–40 (describing examples in which apparent
authority figures were able to induce deference or particular behavior).
171. Prentice, supra note 123, at 372.
172. Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra 7, at 207. Becher and Unger-Aviram rely on the
study performed by Stolle and Slain, where “the presence of exculpatory language in form
contracts does appear to have some deterrent effect on consumers’ propensity to seek
compensation.” Stolle & Slain, supra note 77, at 92; Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra 7, at 207
& n.27.
173. See Prentice, supra note 123, at 372 (asserting that contracting parties will be
unlikely to question the terms of a form contract because a “dense form contract has an
‘authoritative legality’ about it that induces deference”).
174. See id.
175. See Laura Schocker, Why Do Capital Letters So Annoy Us?, BBC NEWS MAG.,
Sept. 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8234637.stm (explaining that language written in
capital letters is commonly thought to connote screaming or yelling).
176. See Prentice, supra note 123, at 374. Prentice suggests, “[T]o the extent that a
preprinted form contract appears to represent the normal condition (the contract that
everyone else is signing), people will anticipate that they would suffer greater regret from
adverse consequences stemming from an abnormal situation (forcing a rewriting of the

ZACKS-FINAL (6-16-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

SHAME, REGRET, AND CONTRACT DESIGN

7/2/2014 5:20 PM

737

contract behavior: to the extent that compliance with the contract (as
indicated by the contract, the behavior of others, social norms, and
otherwise) appears to represent the normal condition, people will
anticipate that they would suffer greater regret from adverse
consequences stemming from an abnormal situation (breaching or
challenging the contract) than those arising from a normal situation
(simply complying with the contract as written).
F. Attribution Theory
The above descriptions of human decision-making processes, biases,
and heuristics neatly tie with the idea of attribution-based theories,
which posit that individuals determine blame for a particular outcome or
behavior based on whether the perceived cause of the outcome or
177
behavior was external or internal. If a person believes that she caused
a particular outcome (or that it is something about her or related to her
178
that caused the event), then she will feel a higher degree of shame.
179
One’s perception of causation is based on the outcome controllability.
If one believes that she could control whether a particular outcome
occurred or not, then she will believe that she is responsible for the
180
outcome (and feel shame under certain social circumstances).
Perceptions about responsibility thus trigger conclusions, both
contract) than those arising from a normal situation (simply accepting the form presented).”
Id. at 377.
177. Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 21, 21–22 (1995) (noting that attribution theories are all “grounded in a common
metaphor that construes the human skin as a special boundary that separates one set of
‘causal forces’ from another”); see also MARK R. LEARY, THE CURSE OF THE SELF: SELFAWARENESS, EGOTISM, AND THE QUALITY OF HUMAN LIFE 96 (2004) (describing how
“[f]ollowing a failure, trauma, or other undesirable event, people may engage in behavioral
self-blame, in which they attribute the event to a behavioral mistake or miscalculation on their
part, they may engage in characterological self-blame in which they attribute the event to
some relatively unchangeable aspect of themselves, or they may blame external factors such
as other people or society at large”); Tracy & Robins, supra note 22, at 12 (describing how
“self-conscious emotions occur when individuals attribute the eliciting event to internal
causes”).
178. Lewis, supra note 26, at 127; Tracy & Robins, supra note 22, at 12 (differentiating
between “the narrow sense of attribution theory (e.g., ‘Did I cause the event?’)” with the
“more general sense of ‘Is something about me or related to me the cause of the event?’”).
179. Lewis, supra note 26, at 128.
180. See id. at 127 (describing how people blame themselves or are blamed by others for
various health conditions based on perceptions about whether the condition could have been
avoided); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 3, at 736 (describing that consumer responses to
product malfunctions depend on whether the manufacturer or consumer is the perceived
cause of the failure and whether such cause was perceived to be controllable).
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individual and social, about whether one should be shamed or
181
stigmatized for a particular condition or outcome. These perceptions,
182
in turn, can be affected by “cultural variation in causal attribution.”
The goal of the contract preparer, then, is to convince the nondrafting party that she is the cause of the “problem” herself rather than
the contract preparer and to reinforce a cultural norm of individual
183
responsibility for one’s actions.
Contract preparers accordingly are
incentivized to prepare the contracts to convey, to the other contracting
party and adjudicators (as well as the community at large), the
voluntariness, objectivity, and fairness of the consent given by the other
184
contracting party to the contract. If an individual either perceives that
others will feel a particular way about her or actually believes that she
herself is to blame for being in a particular contracting situation, then
she will be deterred from acting in a manner likely to lead to an
185
experience of shame.
For example, the inclusion of multiple signature blocks or
disclaimers in all capital letters may suggest to the contracting party that
the adjudicative party will be more likely to blame and shame her if she
186
breaches than the contract preparer.
Such features also could
convince the other party to feel “silly” for not knowing what terms are
181. Lewis, supra note 26, at 127 (concluding that “[t]he degree to which stigmatized
persons can blame themselves or are blamed by others for their condition reflects their
degree of shame”); Tracy & Robins, supra note 22, at 12 (noting that “studies have shown
that internal attributions for failure tend to produce guilt and shame”).
182. Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 166.
183. Id. (noting how “[j]udgments of agency and responsibility are central to moral
judgment, as well as the occurrence of self-conscious emotions” (internal citation omitted)).
Goetz and Keltner describe how “[j]udgments of agency and responsibility also vary
dramatically across different cultures,” again reinforcing the premise that contract preparers
have a vested interest in how the agency and responsibility of the other contracting parties are
perceived by both the other contracting parties and other contracting parties themselves. Id.;
see also Zacks, supra note 9, at 199 (discussing the incentives for contract preparers to depict
within the contract the voluntariness and other indicators of agency and responsibility so that
adjudicators will blame or otherwise feel negatively towards the other contracting party).
184. Lewis, supra note 26, at 128 (noting how “social rules involve not only standards
and rules but also societal beliefs about controllability”). Lewis importantly notes how
“[r]esponsibility can change as a function of new knowledge and information or a change in
social values.” Id. Accordingly, this Article argues that contract preparers have a vested
interest in maintaining the status quo with respect to contracting culture.
185. Id. at 127 (concluding that “[f]or a person to fear stigma from such a [public]
violation, it must be transparent, such as in physical appearance or action”).
186. See Zacks, supra note 9, at 171, 210 (arguing that multiple signature blocks and
boldface language can induce adjudicators to make conclusions about which party to blame
for a particular contractual outcome); Schocker, supra note 175.
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contained in written contract, thus evoking feelings of shame. The use
of capital letters themselves may indicate that the terms should have
been more clear to the other contract party and also warn the other
188
contract party from acting in an undesirable manner. Individuals do
not want to be an outlier in a social situation, so they usually conform to
189
the social norms, or risk shame if they do not.
In addition, blaming one’s self (which can also trigger feelings of
shame) could be understood as a self-preservation technique to avoid
feeling vulnerable in a situation over which an individual exercised very
190
little control. This allows individuals to operate within a risky world
and believe that they are not continuously vulnerable to such
191
situations. People may then have a subconscious desire to be blamed
for their contractual outcomes (particularly those in which they
187. Tamara J. Ferguson et al., Shame and Guilt as Morally Warranted Experiences, in
THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 330, 341
(“Overestimates of an outcome’s controllability might support intense feelings of guilt (for
producing avoidable harm) and shame (for being the type of person who produces avoidable
harm).”); see also Tetlock, supra note 44, at 468 (“One way of pressuring other people to
behave is by indicating to them that one has a low tolerance for justifications or excuses and
that one will treat their behavior as automatically diagnostic of underlying intentions.”). It
also has been demonstrated that the more time an individual spends reading a contract (ex
ante), the more likely the individual is to comply with the terms of the contract. Zev J. Eigen,
Experimental Evidence of the Relationship Between Reading the Fine Print and Performance
of Form-Contract Terms, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 124, 139 (2012)
(“[T]his research presents evidence that suggests that the more time individuals spend
reading contracts into which they are entering, the more likely they are to perform as
contractually obligated.”). Thus, contract preparers may include multiple signature blocks to
induce the other party to read (not just to induce counterfactual analysis), which also could
lead to a higher compliance rate.
188. Schocker, supra note 175 (noting that one’s use of all capital letters in electronic
mail correspondence is commonly understood to connote screaming, while traditionally the
use of all capital letters was reserved to express formality as well as emphasis). It is possible
that contracting parties are consequently affected by the use of all capital letters when
examining such warnings or disclaimers when deciding upon a particular course of contracting
behavior.
189. Tetlock, supra note 44, at 455 (describing “[a]ccountability [as the] critical rule and
norm enforcement mechanism—the social psychological link between individual decisionmakers and the social systems to which they belong”).
190. Prentice, supra note 123, at 406 (“[The] desire to make themselves feel comfortable
in their environment, coupled with the illusion of control . . ., the desire to feel free from
potential victimhood, and to believe that they live in a just world . . . make it easy for jurors
and others to tend to blame investors . . . . These factors are so strong that not only do others
tend to blame victims, victims tend to blame themselves for things that clearly are not their
fault.”).
191. See Bernice Andrews, Shame and Childhood Abuse, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL
BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 176, 178.
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exercised very little power with respect to the negotiation of the
contract). By blaming themselves, people may feel comforted by the
illusion that they can avoid the situation in the future if they acted
differently, even though in all reality they likely will or would not.
Contract preparers should again then reinforce the voluntariness of
the contract’s negotiations and execution in order to present a scenario
where the other contracting party is compelled towards self-blame or is
192
comforted by such a depiction.
These features can encourage
particular counterfactual analysis, meaning that the individual will
attempt to determine what changes in the facts or variables involved in
193
an outcome would have resulted in a different outcome. Contractual
provisions that indicate that the contracting party had multiple
opportunities to walk away, such as by the inclusion of multiple
signature blocks or a boldfaced caption before the signature page
indicating that the contracting party had consulted counsel prior to
executing the contract, could lead one to blame one’s self were one to
194
consider breaching or challenging the contract.
The negative emotions discussed earlier in this Article are also
associated with, and may even trigger, such counterfactual analysis on
195
the part of the individual.
Again, in the contract context, contracts
may trigger particular emotional responses (e.g., shame) that may be
associated with particular counterfactual thinking (e.g., “If only I did not
sign the contract, I would not be in this mess”). Or, contracts may
192. Zacks, supra note 9, at 210.
193. Robert N. Strassfeld, If . . . : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
339, 345 (1992) (“Counterfactual considerations intrude at many stages in legal factfinding
and decisionmaking. Sometimes we acknowledge their presence, but other times we remain
unaware of them. Sometimes counterfactuals help focus our inquiry, but other times they
lead us astray. Nevertheless, whether express or implicit, helpful or misleading, they are
there.”).
194. Zacks, supra note 9, at 210 (arguing that such provisions can induce adjudicators to
make similar conclusions about which party is to “blame” for a particular contractual
outcome or situation).
195. BAUMEISTER, supra note 20, at 268 (“[T]here is some evidence that emotions
stimulate counterfactual thinking, defined as imagining events or outcomes that differ from
reality.”); Giorgio Coricelli & Aldo Rustichini, Counterfactual Thinking and Emotions: Regret
and Envy Learning, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y. B 241, 246 (2010) (suggesting
“an adaptive role of emotions, like regret and envy, which . . . . proceed from a
counterfactual consideration of outcomes”). For example, it has been demonstrated that
signing a document on the front page (as opposed to the end page) can increase a party’s
honesty. Lisa L. Shu et al., Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases
Dishonest Self-Reports in Comparison to Signing at the End, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
15197, 15198 (2012).
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trigger the anticipation of shame that would be associated with
prospective counterfactual thinking (e.g., “If I challenge this contract, I
will be shamed”).
As discussed in this Part, the stakes are high for the contract
preparer: the ex ante contract features, while profitable at the front end,
can “increase delinquency and foreclosure rates,” which are costly at the
196
back end. The balance for contract preparers is to create a contract
that takes advantage of cognitive biases and other decision-making
processes of contracting parties both at the time of contract formation as
197
well as during the term of the contract. The contract needs to induce
deference as written both for execution’s sake and for the sake of
198
As seen in the example of subprime
compliance and performance.
mortgages, lenders may have succeeded in creating a contract that
induced the ex ante contracting behavior desired while also being able to
realize a lower level of strategic default than might otherwise be
199
expected.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF SHAME AND REGRET
The anticipation and experience of shame and regret ultimately may
200
be about the resolution of conflict. At a fundamental level, the social
strategies individuals employ are based on an understanding that other
individuals are also pursuing the same goals (whether making gains or
201
social alliances).
Based on “[t]he inhibitory dimensions of
shame . . . as a defensive strategy which can be triggered in the presence
of an interpersonal threat,” one can better understand the strategic use
202
of social signals inducing shame.
In other words, subordinate

196. Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1133–35.
197. See supra Part III.E.
198. See supra Part II.D.
199. See Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1127 (arguing that the complex and multidimensional
design of subprime mortgage contracts is purposefully exploitative of borrowers’ imperfect
rationality); White, supra note 8, at 971–72 (describing the lower than expected level of
default among underwater homeowners).
200. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 101 (“In a straightforward contest, where
there is likely to be a winner and a loser, the animal who loses requires a strategy that will
inhibit (turn off) its challenging behavior. . . . [T]he non-verbal communicative patterns of
shame appear to be related to de-escalation in potential and actual conflict situations.”).
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing Paul Gilbert, The Evolution of Social Attractiveness and Its Role in
Shame, Humiliation, Guilt and Therapy, 70 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 113 (1997)); see also
Scheff, supra note 23, at 405 (concluding that “social control involves a biosocial system that
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individuals do not spontaneously experience shame or anticipatory
feelings of shame in a vacuum. Rather, aggressive individuals attempt
203
to induce others to submit.
Without submission, the aggressive
204
individuals would not “win” and achieve dominance. The signals the
aggressive individuals send often can affect the physiological activity of
205
the other, resulting in submissive behavior.
Contracts similarly address the resolution of current and future
206
conflicts.
Contracts detail current and future obligations and give a
roadmap of how disputes will be handled, both procedurally (e.g.,
207
arbitration) and substantively (e.g., damages).
Accordingly, contract
preparers only achieve their desired contractual outcome by inducing
208
If contract preparers can “take” and
submission by the other party.
induce individuals to “give up” and not contest or breach a particular
contract, then they have established their dominance within the
relationship (and more importantly, they have achieved their desired
209
economic end).
Social rank (powerful corporate actor versus small
individual) also might be relevant, as dominant players “have much
more power to make subordinates attune to their self-interests than the

functions silently, continuously, and virtually invisibly, occurring within and between members
of a society”).
203. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 102 (“[I]t is not only aggression that
determines dominance and rank structure but also the subordinate behaviors that are
elicited.”).
204. Id. (“If, and only if, the subordinate recognizes the relationship, or ‘predicts’ the
outcome of an agonistic encounter by immediately showing submission, can we assume that a
dominance relationship exists.” (quoting Irwin S. Bernstein, Dominance: A Theoretical
Perspective for Ethologists, in DOMINANCE RELATIONS: AN ETHOLOGICAL VIEW OF
HUMAN CONFLICT AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 71, 80 (Donald R. Omark et al. eds., 1980))).
205. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 106 (describing “[r]egulation-dysregulation
theory (RDT)” as offering “insights into the ways that social signals, originating in the
external world, impinge on and influence the biological state of the receiver(s),” which, in the
case of social signals indicating that the individual is not acting properly, involve “atypical
physiological and psychological states associated with symptoms (e.g., depression, anxiety,
anger, boredom) and reduced capacities to concentrate and act efficiently” (citing Michael T.
McGuire & Alfonso Troisi, Unrealistic Wishes and Physiological Change, 47
PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 82 (1987))).
206. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.3 (3d ed. 2004) (“The
decision to recognize purely executory exchanges of promises also allowed the parties to
engage in more sophisticated planning for the future.”); id. § 12.1 (“Our system of contract
remedies . . . is aimed, instead, at relief to promisees to redress breach.”).
207. Id. § 1.3.
208. See Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 101.
209. See id. at 101–02.
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210

other way around.” If individuals believe they occupy a different rung
on the social ladder than the contracting party (and there often is a
disparity in bargaining and other power), then the contracting party may
211
be in a better position to influence the other party’s behavior.
This
may be seen in the negotiation and execution stages of the contract,
where the party not preparing the contract often defers to the written
212
contract as written by the contract preparer.
As mentioned above, in addition to behaviors associated with the
shame experience itself, another important part of shame behavior is
213
shame avoidance. Despite urges to act differently, the anticipation of
shame may deter individuals from acting in accordance with those
214
Similarly, one may withdraw from those situations where
urges.
shame might be experienced, including situations involving asking for
215
help. Although one may feel angry or frustrated in such situations (to
cover up one’s shame), one is more likely to act aggressively from such
216
anger or frustration from a superior social position. Thus, as between
two contracting parties, the socially subordinate contracting party may
217
be less likely to display anger upon feeling shame. Similarly, one who
is afraid of feeling shame is unlikely to reveal or publicize the actions
218
that involve a failure to measure up to others’ behavior.
This is
important because the goal of the contract preparer often will be

210. Id. at 104.
211. See Dov Cohen et al., The Sacred and the Social Cultures of Honor and Violence, in
SHAME: INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21,
at 261, 274 (describing cultures of honor where “deference must be paid to a person higher on
the social ladder”).
212. See Zacks, supra note 15, at 1474 (describing why parties sign contracts as
presented, including the fact that many contracts are presented on a “take it or leave it” basis
by an agent of the other party who does not appear to have the authority to negotiate or
modify the terms).
213. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 23 (“At this level, shame avoidance is a safety behavior no
different in kind from that associated with any threat . . . .”); Gilbert & McGuire, supra note
38, at 99 (describing shame as “an aversive experience . . . which people are highly motivated
to avoid”).
214. Macdonald, supra note 29, at 148 (stating that “[s]hamelike or embarrassing
predicaments are . . . strong motivators of socially avoidant behavior”).
215. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 23–24.
216. Id. at 23 (“[D]ominant individuals can hide their shame in anger far easier than can
subordinates.”).
217. See id.
218. Id. at 20 (“Social comparison and the anticipation of how others will evaluate and
respond to negative information about the self also plays a crucial role in acts of revelation.”).
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deference and compliance on the part of the other party, which suggests
219
incorporating a difference in status explicitly into the contract.
As discussed in Part II supra, contract preparers may be rigging
social strategies if the written contracts can send inaccurate or biased
signals about how individuals should respond in particular situations in
220
order to maintain their status within the community.
In this way,
contracts may reinforce a particular social hierarchy, at least with
respect to the particular positions of the contract preparer versus the
221
other contract party. Whether in the employer/employee context, the
broker/client context, or the seller/consumer context, contracts may be
more about reinforcing and even enlarging disparities in bargaining
power as opposed to soliciting consensual agreements that are at worst
222
neutral with respect to such issues.
This Article suggests that such
219. For more information, see supra Part II.B for a discussion regarding social status
and the relevance of shame as well Part III.F for a discussion regarding the uses of authority.
What is particularly interesting about shame responses in the contract situation is that the
contract preparer and other contract party often are not face-to-face after the contract has
been formed. Thus, much of the emotional displays associated with shame (such as looking
down or covering one’s face) are not available to the other contract party. Instead, the only
submission possible is the acquiescence to the contractual result as demanded by the contract
preparer. More importantly, the emotional displays associated with shame are only
instructive with respect to the actual shame experience; as discussed below, it is likely that
contract preparers rely on anticipatory feelings of shame with respect to inducing particular
contractual behavior. See infra text accompanying notes 225, 228. In addition, individuals
rely on others to provide indications or signals about what social strategies to use when
negotiating acceptance within a group. See infra text accompanying notes 226–27.
220. See supra Part II.D.
221. See Zacks, supra note 9, at 201.
222. Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U. BALT.
L. REV. 1, 66 (2011) (asserting that, under the “modern contract law system,” “[b]argaining
power is increased via each contract the stronger party enters into, because the stronger party
is able to reap more gains from each contract than it otherwise would with less bargaining
power”). Even the solutions designed to address bargaining power inequalities may be more
effective at conveying a sense of successful reform as opposed to actually achieving it. Id. at
68, 77 (concluding that “compliance with [reforms such as] disclosure statutes will give the
appearance that the quality of the weaker party’s mutual assent has increased, when in fact it
has not. . . . [Disclosure statutes] justify the [abuse] of power by the party with superior
bargaining power both by masking the power imbalance embedded in the very structure of
modern contract law and diverting critical attention and analysis away from that structure as a
whole”); see also Zacks, supra note 9, at 223 (concluding that “reforms appear to be
ineffective in modifying the actual contracting situation while reinforcing existing adjudicative
biases. This, in turn, precludes a deeper and more accurate examination of the contracting
context. If we are comfortable with reforms that make us feel better after the fact about the
contracting context (regardless of effectiveness), then we are unlikely to search for evidence
that the context was not as depicted by the contract’s content and presentation” (footnotes
omitted)).
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reinforcing behavior is elicited not at the contract negotiation or
execution stage, but instead is at the post-formation stage, at which
223
point much contracting behavior occurs.
Moreover, these behaviors
224
can be triggered, at least in part, by particular contract features.
On the other hand, shame may be seen as “an essential motivator”
225
for desirable social behavior. The fear of shame can not only prevent
illegal acts but also can motivate “altruistic” acts that reinforce the
226
image of an individual as a valuable member of the group. Although it
is doubtful that any particular person benefits from complying with their
contract, at least from the perspective of whether the group accords such
a person any additional respect or admiration, it may be that contract
compliance is a prosocial behavior that permits more parties to engage
227
in contract-making and the exchange of goods. If people cannot rely
on the promises made within the contract, the argument may proceed,
then contract preparers (often the “sellers”) may engage in fewer
transactions with a smaller number of buyers (those who are personally
known to be trustworthy), which would be damaging to the entire
228
group.
Law, then, fills any void left by social pressure to ensure compliance
229
with one’s contract.
As long as the redress matched what the other

223. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 7, at 208.
224. See supra Part III.E.
225. Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 232.
226. Id.
227. See id. (stating that when shame encourages compliance with group norms, this
creates “[p]rosocial behavior” which “helps to maintain mutually supportive relationships”).
228. Robinson et al., supra note 43, at 1650–51 (“In the small groups in which humans
have evolved, the marginal benefit of having each individual support punishment for
wrongdoings might have reduced the number of transgressions in the group and, thus,
protected an individual’s health, property, and ability to make contracts.”). Robinson and
colleagues note that “[t]his last element, contracts, is worth special consideration.” Id. at 1651
n.62. They argue that “[b]ecause of humans’ abilities to represent abstract costs and benefits,
the number of social exchanges that are possible is much, much larger than in other
organisms . . . . As the range of possible exchanges increases, the advantage of the ability to
enforce contracts increases.” Id.; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 206, § 1.3 (noting that
“purely executory exchanges of promises did not become important in practice until a
relatively advanced level of economic development had been attained”).
229. BAUMEISTER, supra note 20, at 150 (“As cultures grow more elaborate and
complex, social life consists of an increasing proportion of interactions with
strangers. . . . [P]eople are less motivated to treat each other properly when they do not
expect ever to see each other again.”). Baumeister describes how, accordingly, “to make
people honor it the [financial] deal [between strangers] will usually be confirmed in some way
that can be proven to be legally binding, such as a signed contract.” Id.
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bargained for (e.g., expectation damages, in many cases), then the
contract arguably would have served its purpose, regardless of how
230
many individuals actually breach their contracts.
As argued in this
Article, however, contract preparers may utilize social pressures and the
anticipation of shame or guilt to influence a party’s compliance with the
contract, particularly if the legal and economic incentives for the other
party suggest non-compliance as a viable option. In other words, one’s
attributions about her own behavior help determine her emotional and
231
behavioral responses to a situation.
The written contract may
accomplish this through the inclusion of multiple signature blocks, a
formal legal appearance, boldface type for disclaimers, reliance
232
language, and other features discussed in this Article.
V. CONCLUSION
By reinforcing the social norm of contract as sacred promise and
anticipating the negative emotions, cognitive biases, and judgment
heuristics of the other parties, contract preparers (often corporate
actors) can enjoy the other party’s contract compliance or deference
(even if not mandated by the legal regime), while still relying on the
flexibility of the legal regime to abandon contract compliance on their
233
own behalf when economically beneficial.
One possible benefit to the growing public awareness of human
behavior and its manipulability is the additional caution individuals may
exercise when making particular decisions. As individuals become more
230. See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 408.
231. LEARY, supra note 177, at 97 (“The same harmful event may produce different
emotional reactions depending on how people talk to themselves about what they have
done.”).
232. See supra Part III.E.
233. See White, supra note 8, at 1023 (“Individuals should not be artificially discouraged
on the basis of ‘morality’ from making financially prudent decisions, particularly when the
party on the other side is amorally operating according to market norms and could have acted
to protect itself by following prudent underwriting practices.”); Gregory M. Gilchrist, The
Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 29 (2012) (concluding that
“[c]orporations do not have autonomy or emotionality. . . . They do not deserve blame
because they lack the volitional capacities we associate with moral blameworthiness”);
Kenneth R. Harney, The Moral Dimensions of Ditching a Mortgage, WASH. POST, Nov. 28,
2009, at E1 (quoting Fannie Mae spokesman Brian Faith, who indicated that “there’s a moral
dimension to this as homeowners who simply abandon their homes contribute to the
destabilization of their neighborhood and community” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because they lack these volitional capacities, corporations may act without regard to the
possible shame associated with blameworthy actions such as breaching a contractual (and
moral) promise.
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aware of what contract preparers do in order to induce them to act in a
particular manner after the contract has been formed, perhaps
individuals will become more careful actors when considering a possible
adverse course of action with respect to their contracts. If regret
aversion can be diminished and knowledge of actual social practices and
norms (versus perceived and artificially constructed social practices and
norms) can be increased, then contract preparers will be less advantaged
234
by undetected current contract-preparation methodology.
For
example, if the public was aware that contract preparers were aware of
the biased portrayal of contractual breach, perhaps the decision
regarding whether to breach or challenge the contract would not appear
so fraught with peril. A more informed and perhaps more cynical
contracting public may be better prepared to respond to such provisions
when encountered in the future. Given the limited success, however, of
“awareness campaigns” in addressing market-driven strategies by more
powerful actors or otherwise changing behavior, it is nevertheless
dubious to presume that a more informed public will be better equipped
when making post-contract formation decisions, particularly given the
235
unconscious or uncontrollable aspects of the shame experience.
Because of the complicated and, in some cases, unpredictable,
nature of the emotional and cognitive processes involved in human
decision-making, this Article does not contemplate or describe a
panacea for economically irrational actions or decisions in the ex post
contracting context, such as regulatory oversight of the contract
236
preparation for “troubling” provisions.
Indeed, in the absence of
empirical data demonstrating that the critique laid out in this Article is
in fact accurate and predictable, it is not desirable to attempt to insert a
“better” decision-maker for the contracting party. As has been noted
elsewhere, it would be difficult to imagine a centralized approach,
directed also by fallible individuals, that would enable decision-makers
to “weigh all the economic, scientific, and psychological evidence
objectively, to stand on nuanced distinctions, and to adopt policies that

234. See supra Part III.C (discussing how contract preparers can take advantage of the
contract signer’s desire to avoid regret).
235. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 3, at 669; see also, e.g., id. at 731.
236. Accordingly, “individuals [may] more or less ‘rationally’ choose to take these nonmaterial, psychological consequences into account” to satisfy “certain needs, although these
needs are non-material.” Zeelenberg, supra note 29, at 331.
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carefully target just those people who need help most.”
If others
cannot “fix” or “optimize” individual decision-making tendencies, and
the solution is not individual knowledge itself, then one is left to
contemplate whether the existing system can be remedied at all.
Perhaps one “should expect policies to be blunt instruments,” but that
does not necessarily dictate comfort with such policies being utilized or
238
manipulated only by one of the affected parties.
Nevertheless, the limits and exploitation of human cognition with
respect to ex post contract decision-making is important for
understanding contract preparation and contemplating possible
239
reforms.
This in turn may undermine the perceived sanctity of a
written contract as moral promise. From an economic standpoint,
undermining such perceptions may be desirable if contracts contain
provisions that, if not breached or challenged, threaten the economic
well-being of the greater society. For example, if more homeowners had
strategically defaulted on their subprime mortgages earlier, perhaps the
mortgage crisis would not have been as prolonged or as damaging
(because fewer mortgages would have been originated or at least would
have been rated more accurately based upon their risk of default). One
can imagine similar conclusions for the next unknown contractingrelated crisis.
If individuals feel constrained by social norm
considerations (reinforced by the written contract) from breaching or
contesting economically one-sided or illegal contracts, then such
contracts and their associated transactions will presumably proliferate,
with possibly severe consequences.
It may be, of course, that it is the very “moral” nature of the
promises made in written contract that help deter undesirable breaches,
regardless of contract law’s general disposition that monetary damages
240
are appropriate to compensate for breaches.
If monetary damages
237. Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother Is Watching You: New
Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 737 (2009).
238. Id. at 737. Rizzo and Whitman are concerned about paternalism that does “not
clearly distinguish private, voluntary efforts from public, mandatory ones,” which, as a brightline test, would provide part of a “bulwark against the problems of vagueness, including the
threat of slippery slopes.” Id. at 739.
239. Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 259 (concluding that, although “the limits of cognition
are not a universal explanation of either contract law or the limits of contract,” the “[o]ther
teachings of experience, as well as concepts of efficiency and morality . . . can be given
appropriate weight only when we know the psychological framework within which actors
operate when making choices”).
240. See Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 166.
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generally do not compensate an aggrieved party fully for a breach
(whether because of the time involved in litigating a dispute or the
inability of the legal system to ascertain the actual amount of loss
suffered), then perhaps “our legal system works better . . . by relying on
moral forces, such as they are, to fill the gap in inducing appropriate
241
performance.”
Without accepting or denying this assertion as a general proposition,
my response is that this Article is not addressing the role of morality
with respect to written contracts generally. Instead, this Article
examines whether contract preparers can anticipate and exploit
individuals’ moral and emotional impulses regarding breach to their
advantage. In other words, general moral sentiments regarding breach
may be beneficial in the abstract to ensure that most people perform
their promises, but this contention only has validity if all contracting
parties are playing by the same sentimental rules. As seen in this
Article, contract preparers depict a world in which contractual promises
have a moral component, are specifically sought and enforced, and are
rarely challenged or breached, while those same contract preparers
make their own contracting decisions based on a more basic, if real,
economic calculus.

241. Shavell, supra note 64, at 460; see also Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at
421 (noting that individuals’ responses to breaches can be influenced by the belief “that
breaking a contractual promise is a moral violation, [so] it is reasonable to think that
breachers should not be permitted to profit (above the expected benefit of the contract) from
their intentional bad act”).

